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1    Introduction 
When European Council President Donald Tusk stepped before the press on 2 July 
2019, he was visibly relieved: “I know that it has taken us longer than planned, but 
we are still on time […] I think that it was worth waiting for such an outcome” (Tusk, 
2019). Following a marathon set of negotiations, EU heads of state and government 
had finally agreed on a package of nominations for the bloc’s top jobs, proposing, 
among others, German minister Ursula von der Leyen for the post of European 
Commission president (Müller Gómez & Wessels, 2019, p. 72). 
The nomination process had proven highly complex and contentious. In several 
high-level meetings of the European Council, national leaders discussed and even-
tually had to bring together diverse positions on the names and criteria that should 
play a role in the selection, such as candidates’ qualification, party affiliation or gen-
der (Nasshoven, 2019, pp. 282-288). The final agreement furthermore provoked 
strong reactions by members of the European Parliament: MEPs criticized that, with 
the nomination of Ursula von der Leyen, leaders proposed a politician who had not 
been a lead candidate in the European elections (Schwarzer, 2019, p. 1). 
As of today, however, little is known on whether this intense debate at EU level was 
also accompanied by a shared, EU-wide debate in the media. In particular, in light of 
the literature on Europeanization and the European Public Sphere (EPS), it remains 
an open question whether the media in EU countries advanced nationally distinct 
accounts of the nomination process or whether reporting was Europeanized, fea-
turing similar frames of reference across borders and involving EU-wide speakers. 
The present thesis seeks to address this matter, comparing the quality newspaper 
coverage in three European countries at the time of the European Council negotiati-
ons in June and July 2019. The focus is on the selection of the new Commission pre-
sident. The research question can be formulated as follows:  
To what extent was the media coverage of the 2019 Commission president nomination Euro-
peanized in terms of the framing and discourse participants in German, French and Irish qua-
lity newspapers? And what does this imply for the emergence of a European Public Sphere? 
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The interest of this analysis mainly stems from a frequent argument in the literature 
that news reporting on European affairs matters for the democratic legitimacy of the 
EU (De Wilde, 2019, p. 1193). Among others, Europeanized reporting may provide 
common points of reference to citizens of different member states, thereby facilita-
ting “transnational communication” and “cross-border dialogue” (Dutceac Segesten 
& Bossetta, 2019, p. 1052) about EU affairs. While shared frames of reference are 
considered to be of particular importance in this regard (e.g., Risse, 2010, p. 139), it is 
precisely on the issue of framing that existing findings are least conclusive. 
The present thesis contributes to this debate and research in several ways. First, it 
analyzes a novel and recent case, as has been called for in the literature (e.g., Adam, 
2015, p. 7). This allows for expanding and updating the knowledge on Europeanizati-
on and EU-wide frames in particular. At the same time, the analysis of the specific 
case at hand also appears particularly interesting from a more theoretical perspec-
tive: Previous research provides reasons to expect both high and low levels of Euro-
peanized reporting concerning the nomination of the Commission president. There-
fore, it can serve as a valuable test for the emergence of a European Public Sphere. 
Third, in a broader sense, taking another look at the nomination process in 2019 ap-
pears justified considering its wider relevance for the EU and European integration. 
Recently, a number of studies have addressed its implications for procedures such as 
the lead candidate system or for the distribution of power between the EU’s institu-
tions (e.g., Christiansen & Shackleton, 2019; Nasshoven, 2019). However, no contri-
bution has yet addressed media coverage. The present thesis serves to fill this gap. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: First, the literature on the Eu-
ropean Public Sphere, Europeanization and EU media framing is reviewed, so as to 
define the main concepts and to situate the paper’s research interest in the wider 
debate (ch. 2). Second, the paper’s case is introduced, providing background on the 
nomination process and presenting expectations derived from the literature (ch. 3). 
This is followed, third, by a description of the paper’s research design and method 
(ch. 4) as well as by the presentation of the results (ch. 5). The concluding chapter 
summarizes the main findings and points out avenues for further research (ch. 6). 
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2    Literature: concepts and previous empirical findings 
2.1    The notion of the European Public Sphere 
The present thesis builds closely on the literature on the European Public Sphere 
(EPS). Modeled upon the public sphere concept coined by Jürgen Habermas,  the EPS 1
may be broadly understood as a “communicative space in which European affairs can 
be critically discussed” (Barth & Bijsmans, 2018, p. 215) and in which EU citizens are 
“informed about and involved in debates relating to EU politics and policies” (De la 
Porte & Van Dalen, 2016, p. 280).  2
The relevance of such an EU-wide sphere is commonly discussed with regard to the 
democratic legitimacy of European integration and the European Union. Indeed, an 
EPS if frequently considered either an indicator or “prerequisite for democracy in the 
EU” (De Wilde, 2019, p. 1193). Among others, it has been argued to open EU “decisi-
on making to a public critique” (Statham & Trenz, 2015, p. 293), to provide an inter-
face between the level of EU governance and society, to enable EU citizens to “inter-
act and talk about (the same) political issues” (De Vreese, 2007, p. 6) and to increase 
the chances that feedback is supplied to European decisions and decision-makers. 
Certainly, much depends on scholars’ broader normative expectations and under-
standing of democracy, public spheres and the nature of the EU. For instance, there 
are also researchers who see little need for an EPS, arguing that decision making in 
the European Union is already fully legitimized by the domestic election and scruti-
ny of national governments (see Statham, 2010, pp. 280-281). 
The scope of the present paper does not allow for discussing this in great detail. In 
principle, however, if one agrees that a democratic EU requires some “legitimation 
beyond the nation-state” and that democracy hinges not only on elections and other 
“institutional arrangements” (Wessler, Peters, Brüggemann, Kleinen-von Königslöw 
 According to Habermas (1996), the public sphere can be conceived as “an arena for the perception, 1
identification, and treatment of problems affecting the whole of society” (p. 301).
 In line with the predominant part of the literature and given the thesis’ research interest, the study 2
limits its considerations to “a European sphere that focuses on the European Union” (Pfetsch, Adam 
& Eschner, 2008, p. 488). For a broader understanding of the EPS, see Koopmans & Statham (2010).
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& Sifft, 2008, pp. 1-2), it appears plausible that an EU-wide arena of public debate, 
connecting citizens and institutions, could at least contribute to the democratic legi-
timacy of the EU (see also Adam, 2015, p. 1; De Vreese, 2007, p. 8). 
The academic research on the European Public Sphere has gained increased popula-
rity since the 1990s (Bijsmans, Galpin & Leruth, 2018, p. 827). Yet while earlier lite-
rature sought to identify a unitary, supranational public sphere that would be “based 
on European media, and require a common language and a shared identity” (Adam, 
2015, p. 2), this perspective has been widely dismissed in contemporary research (for 
more information on this approach, see Grimm, 1995, pp. 294-295). 
First, empirically, there is “not much to be found” (Koopmans, 2007, p. 185) if one 
looks for a singular, pan-European public sphere. More importantly, second, the per-
spective has proven theoretically unconvincing. By applying an ideal-type concepti-
on of the national public sphere, it assumes a degree of “linguistic and cultural ho-
mogeneity as well as of political centralization that may not correspond to many 
contemporary democratic nation states, such as Belgium” (Cremenosi, Seddone, Bob-
ba & Mancosu, 2019, p. 671). Noting in particular the “multilevel character of the 
EU” (Adam, 2015, p. 2), the requirements seem to high. 
For such reasons, the present thesis instead follows a second and predominant 
strand of the literature, suggesting that the European Public Sphere may develop by 
way of a Europeanization of national public spheres (e.g., Gerhards, 2000, p. 293). The 
term Europeanization, in general, describes the “domestic impacts of European inte-
gration” (Koopmans, 2007, p. 185). In the present case, these impacts pertain to the 
national public spheres. According to the perspective, hence, an EPS can come into 
being if the existing national communicative spaces open up for debates with a Eu-
ropean dimension, integrating linkages to the EU and other member states (Adam, 
2015, p. 3; Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2017, p. 799). 
National mass media have a key role in this process as the “main communicative 
space” (Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2012, p. 445) of the public sphere. Clearly, mass me-
dia do not constitute “the only forum, or form, of public debate” (Statham & Trenz, 
2015, p. 291). Nonetheless, first, the media are the fora with the broadest public 
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(Cremenosi, Seddone, Bobba & Mancosu, 2019, p. 673). Second, even more “than on 
the national level, the communication flow between the EU […] and the public de-
pends on the mass media” (Koopmans, 2007, p. 184), as most people do not regularly 
have direct experiences with European Union politics (De Vreese, 2007, p. 7). 
Therefore, analyses of national public spheres by and large consist in analyses of na-
tional mass media, the present thesis following such research. As the subsequent 
section will outline, however, a great deal of uncertainty remains about the extent to 
which the national media have indeed become Europeanized. 
2.2    Europeanization of national media 
Empirical studies analyzing the Europeanization of national media have so far yiel-
ded inconclusive results. In part, this is due to the different criteria and indicators 
used to measure Europeanized reporting. 
A key requirement often formulated is the visibility of European issues, events and 
actors in the media, the term European commonly used to refer both the supranatio-
nal EU level (vertical Europeanization) and to the developments and actors in other 
member states (horizontal Europeanization).  In this respect, the research points 3
towards increasing and, at times, substantial levels of Europeanized news even 
though differences emerge depending on the particular events, countries, media and 
policy fields analyzed (Bijsmans, 2020, p. 3; Trenz, 2008, p. 300).  4
Among others, media coverage tends to peak around key events, such as EU summits 
or European Parliament elections, and to privilege attention to the supranational EU 
level (De Vreese, 2007, p. 10; Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2017, p. 799). Fur-
thermore,“[c]ross-country variation in EU news coverage is a common finding” (Gat-
termann, 2013, p. 439), with higher levels of visibility identified mainly in countries 
with long-standing EU membership and in more deeply integrated countries (e.g., 
 As Kleinen-von Königslöw (2012) argues, events and developments in other member states should 3
be visible in an EPS because, due to the interlinkages in the EU, such developments can “have an im-
pact on the EU community as a whole and on each of its members” (p. 445).
 To provide an example, Trenz (2004) found that, on average, one-third of political news in quality 4
newspapers from six EU countries included a reference to European issues, events or themes (p. 297).
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Brüggemann & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2009, p. 43; Pfetsch, Adam & Eschner, 2008, 
p. 484). Finally, the findings pertain largely to quality newspapers, whereas both in 
tabloids and television news, the visibility of the EU and other member states tends 
to be more reduced (De Vreese, 2007, p. 12; Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2012, p. 452).   
Overall, however, it appears difficult to maintain that “news media in general are 
wedded to the nation-state and ignore European politics” (Risse, 2010, p. 133). 
Such findings notwithstanding, some of the literature has argued that, in addition to 
visibility, the substantive content of and speakers participating in mass-mediated de-
bates also matter as far as Europeanization is concerned. Among others, this is re-
flected in the understanding of Europeanization advanced by Risse (2015), which 
distinguishes three dimensions and can serve as a basis for the present thesis:  
Emphasizing the content of communication (see Risse’s third dimension), several 
scholars have argued that Europeanization fundamentally involves a “parallelization 
of national public spheres” (Koopmans & Statham, 2010, p. 37) and hence a “conver-
gence of the specific content of national debates” (Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 
2017, p. 799). According to this, Europeanization entails that “within an anonymous 
mass public the same European issues are discussed at the same time under similar 
criteria of relevance” (Eder & Kantner, 2000, p. 327; as translated by Pfetsch & Heft, 
2015, p. 32), the latter implying similar frames of reference in the media (Kantner, 
2015, p. 87). Indeed, the notion of framing is often attributed a particular importance 
in the literature (e.g., Barth & Bijsmans, 2018, p. 216; De Vreese, 2007, p. 13). 
1 the visibility of European and EU issues, policies and actors
2 the presence of fellow Europeans as speakers and audiences in the public spheres
3 the discussion of common European themes and issues, using similar frames of reference or making claims across borders
Table 1: Dimensions of Europeanization 
source: own table; based on Risse, 2015, pp. 10-11
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Once again, positions clearly hinge on scholars’ broader understanding of and expec-
tations for a public sphere. Yet if one concurs that a “common communicative space 
requires that we do not talk past each other, that we understand the issues at stake, 
and that we develop some common reference points in order to enable meaningful 
conversations” (Risse, 2010, p. 139), studying media frames can indeed be considered 
“key to unpacking the European public sphere” (Barth & Bijsmans, 2018, p. 216). As 
Risse (2010) underlines, a “debate without common frames of reference is impossi-
ble, even if these frames are heavily contested” (p. 109). 
From this perspective, however, the existing findings are far less conclusive. Whereas 
the media tend to discuss the same issues at the same time (see Risse, 2010, p. 136), 
“studies regarding the convergence of issue interpretations or issue framing are rare 
and their results vary” (Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2017, p. 800). Not least 
against this backdrop, it appears fruitful to focus, in particular, on the framing com-
ponent of Europeanization in the present thesis. Given the ambiguity of the framing 
concept and its importance for the thesis, chapter 2.3 will present some additional 
background in this respect and discuss previous findings in greater detail. 
Beforehand, however, it should not be left aside that the question of speakers as well 
has figured prominently in conceptualizations of Europeanization (e.g., Koopmans, 
2007; Wessler et al., 2008, pp. 47-49). Taken up in Risse’s (2015) second dimension, 
scholars following such an approach commonly argue that Europeanization is mar-
ked by the presence of EU-wide discourse participants — that is, speakers from the 
EU level or other member states — in the national media (p. 10). Where such actors 
are quoted in news reporting, citizens become aware that issues are discussed bey-
ond national borders and, at least at the level of elites, “speakers from different na-
tional public spheres [are] actually talking to each other” (Wessler et al., 2008, p. 12). 
The empirical findings indicate that, when European issues are discussed, “speakers 
from the EU and from other European countries are regularly present in the national 
media” (Risse, 2010, p. 161). Nonetheless, variations can certainly be observed: To 
only provide two examples with a view to conciseness, Kaiser and Kleinen-von Kö-
nigslöw (2017) find a nearly equal ratio of national and European discourse partici-
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pants in their case study on the coverage of the euro crisis (p. 809). Wessler et al. 
(2008), on the other hand, report a “relatively stable level of European speakers at 17 
per cent on average” (p. 47) in their long-term, cross-issue content analysis in five 
EU countries, a share far below the share of national speakers.  
In the present thesis, an analysis of speakers is included as a complement to the stu-
dy of frames, hereby responding to a call in the literature to “focus more on how Eu-
rope is debated and who is putting forward the message” (Adam, 2015, p. 7). Tracing 
the discourse participants may furthermore represent a step towards explaining why 
particular frames are shared across borders or not. 
To be clear, this focus does not imply that other dimensions or indicators of Euro-
peanization, such as visibility, are considered irrelevant. Without doubt, Europea-
nization is best understood as “a multifaceted process” (Cremenosi, Seddone, Bobba 
& Mancosu, 2019, p. 670). Simply, the research is arguably most advanced as far as 
visibility is concerned and has a lot to gain from new findings related, in particular, 
to frames. The subsequent section will put this research project into better perspec-
tive, discussing more closely the existing literature on framing in EU media coverage. 
2.3    Framing in EU media coverage 
In broad terms, frames can be understood as patterns of interpretation, or “interpre-
tative packages” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 3), that “promote some aspects of 
reality at the expense of others” (Barth & Bijsmans, 2018, p. 218). Although various, 
more specific definitions have been proposed in the literature, to frame generally in-
volves selecting and emphasizing some parts of an issue, making them “more salient 
in a communicating text” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). 
A key question frames have been argued to answer is: “[W]hat is at stake?” (Kantner, 
2015, p. 98). Frames hence suggest what a given “controversy is about, the essence of 
the issue” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143 as cited in Potthoff, 2011, p. 46). This 
understanding of frames appears particularly well suited for the present analysis, gi-
ven a common communicative space may be said to precisely require, as laid out 
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above, a shared idea of the issues at stake. It is worth emphasizing that this by no 
means calls for the same opinions or a collective European standpoint to be advan-
ced. Simply, the points of reference for describing or evaluating something should be 
shared across borders, so as to open a common “discursive universe” (Trenz, 2004, p. 
316), enabling meaningful conversations (Kantner, 2015, p. 87; Risse, 2010, p. 145). 
Similarly to the research on the European Public Sphere, framing studies have expe-
rienced a considerable growth since the first half of the 1990s (Weaver, 2007, p. 143). 
Frames have been analyzed in different disciplines, such as communication science 
and psychology, as well as at different levels, including but not limited to media con-
tent (see Matthes & Kohring, 2004, p. 56; Scheufele, 2004, p. 30).  
As far as EU media coverage is concerned, studies have examined, among others, 
how news outlets in different countries frame events like the European elections or 
the eurozone crisis (e.g., Touri & Rogers, 2013; Cremenosi, Seddone, Bobba & Man-
cosu, 2019) and how such framing may matter for public support for European inte-
gration (e.g., Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgarden & De Vreese, 2008). 
Studies specifically tracing the similarity of media frames across member states re-
main scattered, though (Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2017, p. 800; see also De 
Vreese, 2007, p. 13). While it is sometimes argued that “similar frames of reference 
are available in the various national public spheres when European questions are 
discussed” (Risse, 2010, p. 139), several case studies also “point towards the inertia of 
national characteristics” (Drewski, 2015, p. 267; see also De Wilde, 2019, p. 1995). 
For instance, in an analysis of Silvio Berlusconi’s controversial address to the Eu-
ropean Parliament in 2003, Downey and Koenig (2006) report that “[e]ven in a case 
that is ideally suited to be an object of a Europeanized public sphere, we cannot find 
the same framings at the same time with the same intensity” (p. 184). 
Trenz (2000), analyzing the debates over a corruption scandal in the European 
Commission, finds that German newspapers framed the scandal predominantly as a 
moral problem, whereas Spanish newspapers linked it to a financial conflict between 
northern and southern states. Similarly, Drewski (2015) identifies major differences 
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in the framing of the euro crisis: While reporting in Germany primarily featured a 
moral hazard frame, reporting in Spain was dominated by a systemic-risk narrative. 
Díez Medrano and Gray (2010), on the other hand, studying broad frames of Eu-
ropean integration in seven countries, identify more similarities than differences: 
The national media predominantly represented the EU as an association for the ac-
complishment of economic goals (pp. 199, 206). Similarly, Wessler et al. (2008) find 
marked similarities and convergence over time in a long-term assessment of the co-
verage of military interventions and genetically modified food (see also, e.g., Bijs-
mans, Galpin & Leruth, 2017; Touri & Rogers, 2013; Van de Steeg, 2006). 
Importantly, the literature has so far struggled to make sense of such different re-
sults even though some explanations have been proposed: For instance, similarly to 
the findings on visibility, the particular issue, countries and media selected tend to 
matter (e.g., Pfetsch, Adam & Eschner, 2008, p. 484). Furthermore, results depend on 
the yardstick against which frame similarity is assessed and on how concretely 
frames are defined: Naturally, the more abstractly frames are formulated, the more 
similarities emerge (Risse, 2010, p. 155; Wessler et al., 2008, p. 15). 
Even if one takes such considerations into account, however, great uncertainty re-
mains, even more so as far as recent times are concerned. In this context, the present 
study can make a contribution both to the specific debate on frame convergence and 
to the research on Europeanization more broadly, as is outlined in detail below. 
3    The Commission president nomination and Europeanization 
3.1   Background to the case and relevance for research 
The present thesis traces Europeanization in the media coverage of the 2019 nomi-
nation of the president of the European Commission. This chapter serves to introdu-
ce the case, to lay out its theoretical and empirical relevance and to present expecta-
tions derived from the literature, so as to better link the study to the existing rese-
arch. Initially, some context may be helpful: Representing a key event in recent EU 
politics, the nomination of a new Commission president was part of a process of 
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high-level appointments to the European institutions that followed the European 
elections of May 2019 (Müller Gómez & Wessels, 2019, p. 71). 
In several rounds of negotiations in June and July 2019, EU heads of state and go-
vernment put together a list of names to lead, among others, the European Commis-
sion, the European Central Bank and the European Council. The final package was 
presented to the public on 2 July 2019 and set in motion different confirmation and 
election procedures (Tusk, 2019). 
The nomination of a successor to Jean-Claude Juncker raised special attention: The 
European Council’s proposal of Ursula von der Leyen not only came as a surprise to 
observers, but it was also attributed wider implications for the distribution of power 
between the European Parliament and the European Council, among other things 
(Hofmann, 2019, p. 111; Müller Gómez & Reiners, 2019, p. 268). 
In particular, von der Leyen’s nomination represented a break with the Spitzenkandi-
daten process, commonly understood to imply that the “top candidate of the largest 
political group in the European Parliament would become the natural candidate for 
the post of President of the European Commission” (De Vries & Hoffmann, 2019, p. 
5). Even though this led to criticism among MEPs, she was ultimately elected by a 
narrow margin in the EP, making her the first ever female president of the Commis-
sion and the first German to occupy the post since 1967 (Nasshoven, 2019, p. 281). 
As shortly stated in the introduction, a number of research articles have recently ad-
dressed the 2019 appointment process, its institutional background and implications 
(e.g., Christiansen & Shackleton, 2019; Müller Gómez & Reiners, 2019; Nasshoven, 
2019). As of today, however, little is known about media coverage, let alone in terms 
of Europeanization. To the author’s knowledge, the only analyses of reporting that 
address the EU’s leadership decisions examined the time before the elections (e.g., 
Cremenosi, Seddone, Bobba & Mancosu, 2019, p. 679) and notably analyzed the visi-
bility of the Spitzenkandidaten in the media (e.g., Gattermann, 2019).  5
 As far as prior appointment procedures are concerned, research on media coverage is similarly rare 5
and focused on the phase of the election campaign; see notably Hix & Wilks-Heeg (2014) on the visi-
bility of Jean-Claude Juncker and Martin Schulz in the press in Germany and the UK.
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At the same time, the European Council’s nomination of the next Commission presi-
dent, in particular, may represent an interesting case for a study of Europeanization 
— particularly so from the perspective of frames and speakers: 
Based on prior research, the nomination negotiations are likely to have elicited sub-
stantial coverage in the media, due both to the prominence of the heads of state and 
government and to the tension surrounding the summits (De Vreese, 2001, p. 299; 
Touri & Rogers, 2013, p. 177). Above all, the attention most certainly focused on the 
debate over the “top job” of Commission president (Thieme & Wessels, 2019, p. 95). 
While this quite clearly suggests a high level of Europeanization in terms of visibility, 
it simultaneously raises the pertinence of examining how, in detail, the national me-
dia covered the nomination process: Indeed, when audiences are more likely to come 
across media coverage of an event, the relevance of whether this coverage provides 
“common reference points” (Risse, 2010, p. 139) and includes EU-wide speakers ap-
pears greater than in situations where an issue is hardly visible in the media at all. 
Yet precisely as concerns frames and speakers, the previous research suggests very 
much contradicting expectations for the coverage of this specific, recent event. This 
makes it a valuable test case for Europeanization, as the following section will show.  6
3.2   Theoretical expectations derived from the literature 
Based on the existing literature, one could expect both high and low levels of Euro-
peanized frames and speakers in the case at hand. 
From one perspective, the nomination process constitutes a difficult case for Euro-
peanization. This is largely due to the intergovernmental nature of the body deciding 
on the nomination — that is, the European Council — listed among the factors “res-
ponsible for the absence of a truly European public sphere” (Della Porta & Caiani, 
2006, p. 78): The European Council reunites the heads of state and government, with 
 Note that the thesis hence follows studies examining the degree of Europeanized reporting in a spe6 -
cific case, at a specific point in time, providing an indication for how far the broader process of Euro-
peanization has advanced up to a given moment (see Dutceac Segesten & Bossetta, 2019, p. 1054).
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each of them representing, by definition, their member state (Article 10(2) TEU). 
Such a setting makes it likely for an issue to be “discussed in distinctly national or 
even nationalist colors in the various public spheres” (Risse, 2010, p. 143). 
Indeed, “to make EU news coverage relevant to their domestic audience” (Gatter-
mann, 2013, p. 439), the media may easily focus on the respective country’s repre-
sentative, his or her role and priorities in the negotiations and the concerns most re-
lated to domestic debates (see De la Porte & Van Dalen, 2016, p. 284). Hereby, they 
can score higher on news values such as identification, proximity and prominence 
(De Wilde, 2019, p. 1206). Reporting would therefore be marked by a predominance 
of national speakers and by little cross-border similarity in terms of frames. 
On the other hand, however, the nomination and ultimate election of the Commissi-
on president arguably represents a European issue par excellence. It concerned the 
whole of the EU and required a decision taken conjointly by all or at least a big majo-
rity of the heads of state and government (see similarly Van de Steeg, 2006, p. 610). 
Concerns and positions of EU-wide actors therefore had to be reported on, if only to 
explain the absence of a quick agreement. In consequence, the same frames as well 
as EU-wide speakers are likely to appear in the reports of the various national media. 
Furthermore, media organizations are not neutral arenas and “tend to prioritize con-
flict” (De Bruycker, 2017, p. 605); this has been shown for EU coverage as well (e.g., 
De Vreese, 2001, p. 295). A particularly conflictual question in the process concerned 
whether or not the Spitzenkandidaten process would be respected: It had been con-
troversial since the beginning, given French President Macron’s prominent oppositi-
on to the system in its present form, and it remained a salient issue with the nomi-
nation of Ursula von der Leyen, drawing criticism from many MEPs (Christiansen & 
Shackleton, 2019, pp. 50-51). One could hence assume that the media coverage in 
many countries was, in a similar manner, shaped by the conflict over this issue. 
Such an expectation is further bolstered by the observation that both political actors 
and academics tend to discuss the Spitzenkandidaten system in terms of democracy, 
transparency and legitimacy (see Von Sydow, 2019) and several “empirical studies 
confirm the strong role of elite journalism in promoting the democratization […] of 
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the EU” (Trenz, 2008, p. 302). As a result, one may expect not only a similar framing 
of the nomination process in terms of EU-wide norms but also a prominent presence 
of those speakers most protective of the Spitzenkandidaten system, namely members 
of the European Parliament and hence European speakers. 
Taken together, the nomination of the Commission president thus clearly offered 
possibilities for Europeanized media coverage even though the setting of the nego-
tiations suggests remaining cautious. In a sense, it can thus be considered a test case 
for whether supposedly shared EU-wide concerns, such as the democratic quality of 
the process, are sufficient to outweigh “the traditional segmentation of national me-
dia spheres as relatively closed systems of meaning” (Trenz, 2008, p. 299). 
Clearly, much of the study’s results will depend on where, how and against which ba-
seline the similarity of frames and the “Europeanness” of discourse participants are 
measured. Against this backdrop, the subsequent, fourth chapter provides a detailed 
look at the thesis’ methodological approach. 
4    Methodological design 
4.1    Selection of countries, media and timeframe 
First, the geographic scope of the study should be set out. For the present analysis, 
three countries were selected: Germany, France and Ireland. This selection is mainly 
guided by the goal to create a “robust test for Europeanization” (Kaiser & Kleinen-
von Königslöw, 2017, p. 802) in the case at hand. Clearly, an analysis of media con-
tent in three countries is not sufficient to draw any definite conclusions about re-
porting in the entire EU. Nonetheless, if Europeanized coverage was found for coun-
tries that are, from the outset, relatively unlikely to feature similar frames and EU-
wide speakers, this would at least hint at a Europeanization in the EU more broadly. 
An analysis of Germany, France and Ireland appears suitable in this regard, given 
that they vary as to important “[issue-]specific factors that might be hypothesized to 
affect the scope and nature of debates” (Wessler et al., 2008, p. 134) concerning the 
2019 nomination process: First, both initial frontrunner Manfred Weber and the final 
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nominee Ursula von der Leyen are German in nationality, rendering it likely to find a 
distinct national focus and framing in German reporting, as compared to France and 
Ireland. Second, the heads of state and government of the three countries assumed 
very different roles in the negotiations and endorsed different priorities: 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron initially 
appeared to be in the front line of a conflict: Merkel publicly insisted on her party 
colleague Manfred Weber and the Spitzenkandidaten process, while Macron instead 
called for a candidate with government experience (Christiansen & Shackleton, 
2019, p. 50; Hofmann, 2019, p. 111; Nasshoven, 2019, p. 287). Irish Prime Minister 
Leo Varadkar, on the other hand, only assumed a more prominent role when Macron 
and Merkel had collectively decided to back the Socialist candidate Frans Timmerm-
ans; Varadkar opposed this agreement largely because it would end the EPP’s control 
over the Commission presidency (Carreño, Psaledakis & Guarascio, 2019). 
With the media likely focusing on the role and priorities of “their” national repre-
sentative (see ch. 3.2), a Europeanized coverage in the three countries is far from a 
foregone conclusion. Additionally, specific domestic issues tied in with the nomina-
tion process in some of the countries, especially in Germany, where the future of the 
governing coalition was called into question (Bubrowski & Lohse, 2019). This, again, 
makes national differences in the mass-mediated debates more likely. 
Importantly, the selection of Germany, France and Ireland simultaneously ensures 
variation as to broader “background variables — country size, language, the ‘open-
ness’ of national media systems, length of EU membership, degree of EU skepticism 
and so on — that we expect to have an impact on the structures and development of 
public spheres at large” (Wessler et al., 2008, p. 134). This should contribute to the 
representativeness of the results (ibid.; also Koopmans & Statham, 2010, p. 48). 
While Germany and France are both large and founding members, located in the cen-
ter of Europe, adding Ireland allows for including a small, northern country that only 
joined in 1973 and does not take part in all of the EU’s programs, such as Schengen 
(Elliott, 2019, p. 562). Furthermore, each of the countries exhibits a different degree 
of trust in the EU (see European Commission, 2019, p. 136) and represents a different 
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type of media system: Germany corresponds to the democratic corporatist model, 
France most closely resembles the polarized pluralist model and Ireland represents 
the liberal model of media (see Hallin & Mancini, 2004, pp. 90, 143, 198). Finally, in 
terms of the political systems as well, marked differences can be observed.  7
Despite this variation, however, it is not suggested that the sample is without any 
bias. Above all, it would have been desirable to include an Eastern European country. 
Yet the restricted scope of a master thesis as well as practical, linguistic reasons 
made it inevitable to make certain compromises in this regard. 
As for the specific media to be analyzed, national quality newspapers were selected. 
This follows prior Europeanization research arguing that newspapers remain a key 
source of information on political issues even though traditional print readership is 
declining (Koopmans & Statham, 2010, p. 50). Quality newspapers, in particular, con-
tinue to play an important role: Online versions make content “more widely accessi-
ble and immediate than it was previously” (ibid.) and, as leitmedien, they are “closely 
observed by other parts of the public sphere” (Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2012, p. 449). 
In contrast to some previous studies (see, e.g., Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgarden & 
De Vreese, 2008, p. 422), however, quality newspapers are not considered proxies for 
the broader media landscape. Notably, research has found the quality press “to be 
more Europeanized than tabloids” (Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2017, p. 812). 
This must be taken into account in the interpretation of the findings. 
The present thesis furthermore differs from prior research in analyzing a wider array 
of quality newspapers than usual, in order to get as comprehensive a picture of the 
reporting in this media segment as possible: The sample includes newspapers repre-
senting a range of political ideologies all the while accounting for a substantial share 
of total newspaper readership.  8
 For instance, Germany and Ireland most closely represent a parliamentary form of government, whi7 -
le France is often considered a semipresidential system (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 108-111). Also, Germany is 
marked by federalism, whereas the French and Irish systems are strongly centralized (ibid., p. 178).
 See ACPM (2020), IVW (2020) and iLevel (2019) for data on newspaper circulation in Germany, Fran8 -
ce and Ireland. Among others, the sample includes the nationwide daily quality newspaper with the 
highest circulation in each of the countries.
Tracing Europeanization in the Mass-Mediated Debate on 2019 EU Leadership Selection !17
As far as possible, newspapers with similar editorial lines were selected in the three 
countries to allow for cross-border comparisons: The German sample includes the 
conservative daily Die Welt, the center-left newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung and the 
leftist paper taz. In France, the conservative Le Figaro, the center-left Le Monde and 
the more left-liberal-leaning paper Libération were selected. In Ireland, the conser-
vative Irish Independent, the centrist Irish Examiner and the left-liberal-leaning The 
Irish Times are included. Clearly, labels such as conservative, centrist or left-leaning 
represent oversimplifications and can be critically discussed. Most should neverthel-
ess be able to agree that, at least by tendency and as compared to other national me-
dia outlets, the selected newspapers lean to the one or the other side respectively.  9
Taken together, the selection of countries and media hence increases “possible coun-
try differences [and] varies possible ideological differences” (Drewski, 2015, pp. 267-
268). This is important for the interpretation of the results, as is outlined in ch. 4.3. 
In terms of the timeframe, articles are analyzed that were published between 17 June 
and 7 July 2019. This period covers the hot phase of the nomination process in the 
European Council, including the two main EU summits on the issue and the informal 
negotiations in Osaka. With the elimination of Manfred Weber (20 June), the debate 
over Frans Timmermans and the ultimate decision for Ursula von der Leyen (2 July), 
it also spans the time when the political and media attention for the topic was pres-
umably at its peak (Nasshoven, 2019, p. 281; Thieme & Wessels, 2019, pp. 95-96). 
Finally, as for the selection and retrieval of the articles, most of the articles are acces-
sed using the LexisNexis database. Only Süddeutsche Zeitung and Irish Examiner 
had to be accessed via the newspapers’ own archives, given LexisNexis currently 
does not provide full access to these publications. In order to select those articles in 
the timeframe dealing with the nomination of the Commission president, the data-
 The classification of the newspapers advanced here is based on a combination of prior Europeanizat9 -
ion studies and further sources, in particular Bijsmans, Galpin & Leruth (2018, p. 830), Eurotopics 
(2020), KAS (2016, p. 4) and Wessler et al. (2008, p. 37). The label “quality newspaper” is commonly 
accepted as far as the nine papers are concerned. Yet note that the picture is somewhat ambiguous as 
far as the Irish Independent is concerned (see Gattermann, 2012, p. 86; also Dutceac Segesten & Bos-
setta, 2019, p. 1057). In the present study, it was decided to include the Irish Independent as a quality 
newspaper, following recent research (see Hurrelmann & Wagner, 2020).
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bases are first scanned for a list of keywords and phrases, compiled based on an in-
itial reading of articles related to the issue.  10
All articles that mention at least one of the search terms are read. Yet only those ar-
ticles enter into the final analysis that, at least at some point, indeed address the is-
sue of identifying a new head of the European Commission, for example by reporting 
about the controversies at the EU summits or by presenting one of the candidates 
under consideration. In the vast majority of cases, articles were found to explicitly 
refer to the nomination negotiations in the European Council. However, it was deci-
ded to also include articles referring, less specifically, to the “selection” or choice of 
a new Commission president, given this centrally involves the nomination process. 
It should furthermore be noted that teasers on the first page of a newspaper issue — 
a short extract from a main story with a reference to this story — are not included as 
a separate article. Finally, if an article appears twice in the database, it is included 
only once in the analysis. This mainly concerns Le Monde and Le Figaro for which 
LexisNexis sometimes displayed both an original version of an article and a final, 
updated version; in these cases, only the latter version enters into the analysis.  11
4.2    Procedure for the coding of frames and discourse participants 
The examination of frames and discourse participants in the articles proceeds using 
a qualitative content analysis (see generally Mayring, 2015). Content analyses serve 
to describe formal and content-related characteristics of communication (see Früh, 
 The following keywords and phrases were used (translated into German and French respectively, 10
feminine variants included): EC president, Commission president, president of the (EU/European) 
Commission, head of the (EU/European) Commission, leader of the (EU/European) Commission, lea-
dership of the (EU/European) Commission, presidency of the (EU/European) Commission.
 As far as the Irish Examiner is concerned, the retrieval and selection of articles was more difficult, 11
considering the LexisNexis database only includes articles that are published on irishexaminer.com. 
Articles therefore had to be retrieved from an alternative source, the Irish Newspaper Archives (INA). 
This archive grants full access to the Irish Examiner; each edition is available in the form of a scanned 
(photographed) copy. However, the archive is not equipped with a reliable full-text search. Therefore, 
relevant articles had to be identified manually, following the rules set out for the other newspapers. 
The respective articles were then transcribed with the help of a text recognition software (OCR) and, 
as a final step, marked with the date of publication, page number and author.
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2011, p. 27) and are regularly applied to analyze Europeanization in terms of frames 
and speakers (see, e.g., Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2017; Wessler et al., 2008).  
The choice of a qualitative approach is notably motivated by the aim of providing a 
more fine-grained and in-depth analysis of the material. Compared to a quantitative 
analysis, a qualitative design inevitably limits the number of articles and days that 
can be examined (Barth & Bijsmans, 2018, p. 229). On the other hand, however, it 
makes it possible to report findings not only on how often certain frames and spea-
kers appear in the articles, but also on how and in which context they occur. 
More specifically, the analysis of the material proceeds using a system of categories 
(see Mayring, 2000): One set of categories is designed to capture the frames in re-
porting, while the other set serves to analyze the discourse participants (see coding 
scheme in Annex I). The coding is done with the help of the software MAXQDA. 
As far as the frames and their corresponding categories are concerned, they are deve-
loped both deductively and inductively. Proceeding in an entirely deductive fashion, 
that is, tracing pre-formulated frames in the material, appeared impossible in the 
present case — at least if one shares the objective of going beyond such generic and 
very rough frames as human interest or conflict (see De Vreese, 2005, pp. 54-57): 
As has been outlined, the knowledge about the media coverage of the nomination 
remains limited and, in particular, no pre-formulated package of frames addressing 
what was “at stake” (Kantner, 2015, p. 98) in the process is readily available from re-
search. Therefore, a deductive analysis using some constructed set of frames would 
have likely lead to missing salient perspectives in the articles. On the other hand, 
however, purely inductive approaches tend to be plagued by shortfalls in terms of 
reliability and intersubjectivity (Matthes & Kohring, 2008, p. 263).  
For these reasons, a middle way is pursued (see similarly Kaiser & Kleinen-von Kö-
nigslöw, 2017; Van de Steeg, 2006). First, an initial set of frames is devised, combi-
ning insights from a previous Europeanization study by Trenz (2000) and the broader 
literature on the 2019 selection of the Commission president. Analyzing the media 
coverage of the corruption scandal in the Santer Commission, Trenz identified three 
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main frames of the issue: (1) national conflicts and struggles for power between 
countries, (2) ideological conflicts between different factions in the EP and (3) uni-
versal moral standards, in particular the question of democracy (pp. 347-348). 
Even though the case analyzed was a very different one in Trenz’s study (2000), this 
set of frames also constitutes a suitable point of departure for the present analysis: 
First, the three frames closely fit in with the definition of frames underlying the pre-
sent paper, each of them providing a different interpretation of what was at stake 
and, hence, suggesting why the event was relevant. Second, the same questions of 
national power, ideology and democracy feature prominently in the existing acade-
mic accounts of the 2019 nomination process (e.g., Maurer, 2019, p. 88; Müller Gó-
mez & Wessels, 2019, p. 73; Thieme & Wessels, 2019, p. 97). From the outset, it is 
thus at least possible that these frames were also prevalent in news reporting. 
The look into the literature, however, equally leads one to expect that several other 
frames appeared in the coverage as well, such as the issue of the distribution of 
power between the EU’s institutions (see Müller Gómez & Reiners, 2019, p. 268). 
Therefore, in a second step, the initial set of frames is supplemented inductively by 
adding frames during the actual analysis of the newspaper articles. This continuous 
process is guided by questions formulated on the basis of the definition of frames 
stated earlier: What is the controversy about? Why is it relevant? Which consequen-
ces are discussed and, relatedly, who is presented as shaping or being affected by the 
decisions? Relevant passages are marked and, taking note of their similarities and 
differences, the identified “key concepts and thoughts” (Barth & Bijsmans, 2018, p. 
219) are gradually subsumed into broader frames (see similarly Van Gorp, 2010). 
Where possible, these frames are further organized into frame groups, hereinafter 
referred to as “master frames” (Risse, 2010, p. 155). In this way, for example, the de-
mocracy frame already discussed by Trenz (2000, p. 347) is formulated as a subframe 
of the wider master frame ‘EU-wide rules, norms and interests’. For each frame, a 
corresponding category in the coding scheme is drawn up, equipped with a clear de-
finition, anchor examples and coding rules, “determining exactly under what cir-
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cumstances a text passage can be coded with a category” (Mayring, 2000). The defi-
nitions and rules are formulated and revised throughout the coding process. 
Finally, to arrive at as much reliability and intersubjectivity as possible, after all of 
the frames and corresponding categories have been formulated, all articles are scan-
ned again in order to double-check the codings. Clearly, the described process still 
remains, to an important degree, interpretative and subjective, especially as for the 
identification of frames. Although such concerns cannot be eliminated entirely, the 
detailed description of the method and the clear definition of the relevant categories 
should at least make the necessary decisions transparent. 
As far as the discourse participants are concerned, the coding is more straightforward 
and closely follows the existing literature. Geared towards measuring in how far EU-
wide speakers appear in national reporting, the coding system includes three main 
categories: national speakers, EU-level speakers (e.g., members of the European Par-
liament) and speakers from fellow EU countries (see Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königs-
löw, 2017, p. 802). Furthermore, below each of the categories, subcategories are set 
up distinguishing different types of actors (e.g., heads of state and government, par-
liamentarians, academics), allowing for a more fine-grained analysis. 
Note that for both frames and discourse participants, the articles are not coded as a 
whole; instead, the coding units are the individual text passages in the articles ad-
dressing issues related to the nomination of the Commission president. 
A series of further, more detailed rules was devised to ensure the comparability and 
intersubjectivity of the codings. The full list with explanations and theoretical justi-
fications can be found in Annex I. Among others, concerning frames, it was decided 
that a category should be attributed, at a minimum, to one full sentence and, at a 
maximum, to one paragraph; no sentence can be coded with more than one category. 
Concerning discourse participants, coding focuses on extended quotations, based on 
the two-sentences criterion proposed by Wessler et al. (2008, p. 47): Every directly or 
indirectly quoted statement that is at least two sentences long is coded with a spea-
ker category. Guest articles, published interviews and letters to the editor, however, 
are coded only once and flagged for a separate, qualitative discussion (see Annex I). 
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As for most content analyses, each of these rules and restrictions may be criticized. 
However, they appear both necessary and suited to make the coding as transparent 
and replicable as possible and to focus the study on its research interest. 
4.3    Guidelines for identifying Europeanization 
Up to this point, it has been laid out how the frames and discourse participants are 
coded in the material. One also needs to clarify, however, how a Europeanization in 
terms of these frames and discourse participants will be identified. 
As far as frames are concerned, it is a recurring question “how similar interpretative 
structures have to be in order to qualify as indicators for the Europeanization of pu-
blic spheres” (Risse, 2010, p. 155). Clearly, with a view to a shared, EU-wide debate, it 
should be possible to trace some broad commonalities in the presence and frequency 
of frames among the newspapers. Nonetheless, this thesis will follow research ar-
guing that, to note Europeanization, it is by no means necessary to identify a uni-
form debate in all of the newspapers across Europe. Instead, it would be natural to 
find differences in framing; after all, even the coverage of national issues in national 
newspapers is usually marked by variation, reflecting notably the different ideologi-
cal lines of the media outlets (Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2017, p. 800). 
What appears more important with respect to Europeanization, on the other hand, is 
that the similarities and differences in terms of the frames in the newspapers 
“should not form distinctly national patterns” (Van de Steeg, 2006, p. 612); that is, 
the patterns identified in the presence and frequency of frames should not, in a Eu-
ropeanized debate, be easily reduced to differences between countries, superseding 
all other possible logics, such as EU-wide ideological lines of division (see Drewski, 
2015, p. 267; Risse, 2010, p. 119; Trenz, 2008, p. 299). 
A crucial observation would hence be if the newspapers of the same country had 
more in common in the coverage of the nomination than, for example, conservative 
newspapers from different countries. In this case, the mass-mediated debates would 
be marked by “national fault lines” (Van de Steeg, 2006, p. 613) and, by uniformly 
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highlighting specific perspectives, potentially make it harder for citizens in one EU 
country to understand and connect to the debate in another country (Risse, 2010, p. 
109). Against this backdrop, the present paper will compare the presence and fre-
quency of frames within and between countries. In a first step, basic quantitative 
measures of frequency are used. In a second step, a subset of frames is considered in 
a more qualitative manner to allow for fine-grained comparisons. 
Concerning the discourse participants, on the other hand, the “ratio of national and 
European discourse participants” (Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2017, p. 809) will 
serve as the main quantitative indicator. In line with prior research, if speakers from 
the EU level or other EU countries appear about as frequently as national speakers, 
the degree of Europeanization in the speaker dimension is considered to be high 
(ibid.). Again, more fine-grained, qualitative insights concerning the content and 
context of the quotations are added. Having outlined the paper’s methodological ap-
proach, it is now possible to present the results of the study. 
5    Results 
5.1    Initial overall findings 
Before entering into the detailed analysis of frames and discourse participants, some 
initial findings may help to provide context. Note that where specific newspaper ar-
ticles are cited to substantiate or illustrate findings, they are hereinafter listed with 
the respective newspaper, date (month/day, all dates 2019) and title. 
First, in the nine newspapers in Germany, France and Ireland, a total of 225 articles 
were identified as covering the 2019 nomination of the Commission president. Of 
these, the vast majority of 212 articles included at least one passage that could be 
coded with a category for frames or speakers. The 13 other articles were typically 
concerned with a different topic and only briefly touched upon the appointment 
process or summarized the outcome without going into any details (e.g., Die Welt, 
06/18, ‘Kramp-Karrenbauer knöpft sich Günther für Kuscheln mit Linkspartei vor’). 
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As illustrated in the figure below, most of the 225 articles were published in the week 
from 1 July to 7 July 2019, and the smallest number of articles appeared in the se-
cond week (24 June to 30 June). This suggests that it was above all the outcome of 
the nomination process, that is, the proposal of Ursula von der Leyen on 2 July, as 
well as the ensuing reactions that yielded coverage in the media. The general pattern 
is identical for all of the three countries, pointing to synchronicity. 
The figure also points to another finding, though: Reporting overall appears to have 
been much more intense in Germany than in the other two countries. As mentioned, 
the visibility or salience of reporting does not constitute the focus of the present 
analysis, and furthermore, many different pieces of information would have to be 
combined to draw conclusions in this regard.  Nonetheless, it is fair to remark that 12
several initial observations at least point in this direction:  
Most notably, in total, 108 articles addressing the nomination of the Commission 
president were published in Germany, compared to only 53 articles in France and 64 
 Note, for example, that the number of articles published on the topic is likely linked to newspapers’ 12
layout, total number of pages and political scope. Furthermore, the salience of the specific nominati-
on issue in the broader article as well as the length of articles would have to be accounted for in a de-
tailed analysis. Comparing articles’ word count may appear expedient in this regard. Such a decision 
will also face criticism, however, as the word count depends, to some degree, on language.
Figure 1: Summary of initial findings 
source: own illustration
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in Ireland. In addition, more articles appeared in Germany in each of the three 
weeks, and two German newspapers (Die Welt, SZ) published more articles than any 
other daily analyzed. Finally, the tendency remains the same if one considers only 
the articles published on the front page, the most prominent section of a newspaper 
edition. In Germany, 19 articles appeared on the front page, compared to only four in 
Ireland. In France, information on page numbers was not available for Libération; in 
Le Figaro and Le Monde, in total, two articles were published on the front page.  
In sum, there are hence several observations that point to national differences in the 
intensity of reporting, mainly between the newspapers in Germany, on the one hand, 
and those in France and Ireland, on the other hand. By contrast, the papers’ ideologi-
cal orientation does not appear to play a clear role (see the right side of figure 1). 
These differences may be due, in part, to the German nationality of both initial can-
didate Manfred Weber and final nominee Ursula von der Leyen (see also Gattermann, 
2019). As has been explained, the perceived proximity of an event and the promi-
nence of actors are drivers of news coverage (De Wilde, 2019, p. 1196). Further rese-
arch would be needed, however, to come to more solid conclusions. 
The focus of the present analysis is on frames and discourse participants. In this re-
gard, it may be useful to add two initial findings: First, in the total of 225 articles, 
1,485 passages were coded with one of the categories for frames. Second, discourse 
participants were coded in 308 cases. This means that, on average, an article cover-
ing the nomination process contained roughly seven frames and a little over one ex-
tended quotation. It also suggests that the frames devised both deductively and in-
ductively were, on an overall level, clearly represented in news reporting. On this ba-
sis, the next section now turns to a short description of the main frames. 
5.2    Main frames identified in the media coverage 
Based on the procedure outlined in chapter 4.2, six master frames were identified in 
the newspaper reports. The table below provides a short overview (for more details, 
see the coding scheme in Annex I as well as the further explanations below). 
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Some explanations are appropriate. First, as anticipated, most of the master frames 
contain subframes representing a more detailed view on the nomination process. As 
suggested by the grouping, these subframes share broad commonalities in the per-
spective on what was at stake. Nonetheless, the remaining differences should not be 
brushed off. This is notably the case for the master frame ‘EU-wide rules, norms and 
interests’ (F2), containing subframes ranging from considerations of democracy to 
Master frames and subframes
F1: EU resilience 
and unity
• nomination is linked to broader questions of the EU’s viability/existence and unity 
(e.g., crisis of the EU, general capacity to find common solutions and agreements, 
potential disintegration of the EU)
F2: EU-wide rules, 
norms and inter-
ests
• nomination discussed as a question of respecting, supporting or dismissing parti-
cular EU principles, broader norms or interests (e.g., the Spitzenkandidaten system, 
broader values of democracy, diversity)
‣ F2.a: Spitzenkandidaten system as such  |  F2.b: Democracy and transparency  |  F2.c: Balance and diversity  |  
F2.d: Candidate qualification and standing  |  F2.e: Other EU-wide interests
F3: Inter-institu-
tional power
• nomination discussed as a question of the distribution of power between EU ins-
titutions (e.g., the authority of the European Parliament or the prerogatives of the 
heads of state and government in the European Council)
‣ F3.a: Power of the EP  |  F3.b: Power of the European Council  |  F3.c: General/EP vs. European Council
F4: EU party and 
policy interests
• nomination discussed as a question of which party, political group or broad ideo-
logy prevails in the EU and of which political agenda is pursued in the EU (poli-
cies/reforms)
‣ F4.a: Conflicting party interests |  F4.b: EU policy and reform
F5: National po-
wer, pride and 
interests 
• nomination discussed as a question of which country or national leader is predo-
minant in the EU, of which country is represented in the candidate line-up and of 
which country gets to reap specific “national benefits” from the nomination 
‣ F5.a: Germany/Merkel  |  F5.b: France/Macron  |  F5.c: Ireland/Varadkar  |  F5.d: Viségrad/Eastern Europe |      
F5.e: Franco-German duo  |  F5.f: General/Other
F6: Domestic and 
inter-state conse-
quences
• nomination discussed as having consequences/implications beyond the imme-
diate realm of EU policy/politics, affecting in particular domestic politics or the 
broader relationships between countries
‣ F6.a: German politics  |  F6.b: French politics  |  F6.c: Irish politics  |  F6.d: Relationship Germany-France  |                 
F.6e: General/Other
Table 2: Main frames identified  
source: own table; information from Annex I
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the qualification of the candidates. At the same time, the line between some of the 
master frames may at first sight appear fine, notably if one considers F1 and F2. The 
detailed descriptions and coding rules in Annex I serve to demonstrate that there 
are, nevertheless, important differences that can be formulated. 
As a short summary, it can be noted that the first master frame, ‘EU resilience and 
unity’ (F1), links the nomination process to broader questions regarding the EU’s ca-
pacity to find solutions and agreements, the EU’s coherence and unity and, ultimate-
ly, the Union’s existence itself. The perspective hence stretches beyond the single 
nomination procedure in 2019, with both “optimistic” and “pessimistic” views on the 
EU’s state and future being coded with this master frame: 
— “Gelingt das nicht, steht der EU ein langer und aufreibender Kampf um Spitzenjobs bevor, 
der die Gemeinschaft zu spalten droht” (SZ, 06/24, ‘Macrons Zumutung’). 
— “Au bord de l'abîme, l'Europe s'est sauvée en revenant au bon vieux schéma classique” (Le 
Figaro, 07/03, ‘In extremis’). 
The ‘EU-wide rules, norms and interests’ frame (F2), by contrast, addresses not whe-
ther the EU functions and exists but how. The perspective is one of presumably 
shared standards, principles and interests which may or may not be reflected in the 
nomination of the Commission president. A set of five subframes captures the speci-
fic focus of the respective passages, including for example the debate over the Spit-
zenkandidaten system (F2.a), broader norms of democracy and transparency (F2.b) or 
the goal of identifying the most qualified candidates (F2.d.): 
— “Die Fraktionsvorsitzende Ska Keller kritisiert, dass der Rat die Personalfragen in Hinter-
zimmern ausgehandelt hat” (Die Welt, 07/04, ‘Katerstimmung im EU-Parlament’). 
— “Nobody seems to be mentioning the obvious question: who is the best person for this 
job?” (The Irish Times, 06/22, ‘Leaders holding door for UK like some party guest’). 
The third frame (‘inter-institutional power’) introduces the notion of power, albeit 
limited to the relations between the EU’s institutions. In particular, the nomination 
is linked to a struggle between the European Parliament, on the one hand, and the 
European Council, on the other hand: 
— “Doch wird es das Europaparlament tatsächlich wagen […], einen Machtkampf mit den Re-
gierungschefs aufzunehmen?” (taz, 07/04, ‘Auf zum Aufstand im Europaparlament’). 
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Frame F4 and its subframes, on the other hand, depict the nomination as a question 
of party, ideology and policy. The focus is on the political agenda that the candidates 
represent, suggesting that the nomination matters for the policies adopted during 
the next institutional cycle, as well as on the struggle for power between the parties 
and political groups in the European Union: 
— “Ms von der Leyen has previously been supportive of greater defence co-operation in the EU, 
telling a German newspaper earlier this year: ‘Europe's army is already taking shape’” (The 
Irish Times, 07/03, ‘EU summit deadlock broken by surprise nomination’). 
— “Cela étant, le PPE peut malgré tout être satisfait : il conserve la présidence de l'exécutif 
européen qu'il occupe depuis 1995 (sauf entre 1999 et 2004)” (Libération, 07/02, ‘Union 
européenne : l'heure des femmes’).  
The main cleavage advanced by the ‘national power, pride and interests’ frame (F5) is 
one between countries or national leaders. Here, the coverage of the nomination is 
centered on the power and authority of individual countries in the EU, on the natio-
nality of the candidates and on how the choice of a specific candidate relates to a 
presumed national interest, for example: 
— “The package of top jobs announced by EU leaders reinforces the Franco-German pre-emi-
nence” (The Irish Times, 07/03, ‘Centre-right bloc sees share of spoils decline’). 
— “Gewinner und Profiteure — Da ist zunächst einmal Deutschland: Der letzte Deutsche, der 
die Kommission führte, war Walter Hallstein - und das war 1967” (Die Welt, 07/04, ‘Die 
Sensationskandidatin’). 
Note that both F4 and F5 broadly reflect frames already identified in the study of 
Trenz (2000, pp. 347-348). Finally, while all of the previous master frames deal, in 
one way or the other, with the EU, the sixth master frame (‘domestic and inter-state 
consequences’) addresses matters beyond the immediate realm of EU politics. The 
nomination is discussed as having consequences either for domestic politics or for 
the broader relationship between countries: 
— “Die Art, wie der französische Präsident sich über Weber äußere, sei respektlos und belaste 
die Beziehungen zu Deutschland” (SZ, 06/25, ‘CSU versammelt sich hinter Weber’). 
— “Certains y ont même vu une raison de quitter la coalition. Comme s'il fallait pousser coûte 
que coûte vers la crise de gouvernement” (Le Figaro, 07/05, ‘Allemagne : von der Leyen fait 
tanguer la GroKo’). 
As has already been mentioned, the present thesis does not suggest that this list of 
frames is self-evident and entirely exhaustive. Nonetheless, it should reflect the key 
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perspectives on the nomination process and hence provide a good basis for tracing 
differences and similarities in the media coverage, also if one keeps in mind that the 
analysis proceeds along the same categories and rules for each of the newspapers. 
5.3    Europeanization in terms of frames 
In a Europeanized debate, as explained in chapter 4.3, the presence and frequency of 
frames in reporting should not follow “distinctly national patterns” (Van de Steeg, 
2006, p. 612). In a first step of the analysis, one may therefore consider whether the 
frames used to discuss the nomination in one country can also be traced in the co-
verage in other countries. 
At the general level of master frames, this indeed appears to be the case. In fact, all 
six master frames can be identified, at some point, in all of the three countries. There 
is one qualification, however: Whereas in Germany and France, the six frames are 
traceable in each of the national newspapers analyzed, this is not true for Ireland. 
Neither the ‘EU resilience and unity’ frame (F1) nor the ‘inter-institutional power’ 
frame (F3) could be identified in the reporting of the Irish Examiner. 
In part, this may be attributed to the smaller number of relevant articles (10) publis-
hed in the Irish Examiner. It should be noted, however, that in Le Monde (12) and Li-
bération (13), the number of articles is not much higher and yet, there, all of the 
master frames can be traced. The observation hence provides a first hint, at a general 
level, that the availability and similarity of frames across borders may in fact have 
been limited. Given the finding applies to only one out of the three newspapers in 
Ireland, however, it should not be overstated at this point. 
A consideration of frequencies should bring greater clarity: What proportion of all of 
the passages coded in the articles of a newspaper (e.g., Die Welt) are coded with a 
particular frame (e.g., F1)? And how does this compare to the coverage in other 
newspapers? In the following, these frequencies are expressed as percentages and 
rounded to the nearest one percent, so as not to exaggerate the mathematical preci-
sion of the content analysis. Values with one decimal place are reported in Annex II. 
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Again, to get an overview, it is useful to first consider the master frames — and once 
again, at first sight, there are important cross-border commonalities (see also fig. 2): 
Most notably, in all three countries, the ‘EU-wide rules, norms and interests’ frame 
(F2) and the ‘EU party and policy interests’ frame (F4) are highly common. They are 
the two most frequent master frames in eight out of the nine newspapers and jointly 
account for half of the frames in each paper or more. Remarkably, the ‘EU-wide rules, 
norms and interests’ frame (F2) indeed tops the list in most newspapers. Both fin-
dings, one could argue, point towards a common debate. 
Yet already at this level, there are national peculiarities that suggest caution. Mainly, 
whereas in all German dailies, a clear predominance of the ‘EU-wide rules, norms 
and interests’ frame (F2) is observable, representing the most frequent frame in all 
three newspapers and by itself accounting for over one-third to almost half of the 
frames, the other papers display a far more ambiguous pattern: 
In French media, ‘EU party and policy interests’ appear about as frequently (Le Mon-



















F1: EU resilience 
and unity 4 % 5 % 2 % 6 % 5 % 5 % 8 % — 6 %
F2: EU-wide rules, 
norms, interests
40 % 39 % 49 % 29 % 36 % 32 % 26 % 12 % 30 %
F3: Inter-institu-
tional power
8 % 8 % 7 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 1 % — 6 %
F4: EU party and 
policy interests
27 % 27 % 22 % 30 % 32 % 32 % 26 % 38 % 30 %
F5: Nat. power, 
pride, interests
13 % 15 % 8 % 24 % 23 % 28 % 24 % 31 % 22 %
F6: Domestic and 
inter-state conse. 8 % 6 % 12 % 10 % 3 % 2 % 15 % 19 % 6 %
Table 3: Shares of the master frames in the nine newspapers 
source: own table; data from Annex II (values rounded so that the percentage total in each 
column is 100; rounding error minimized; most frequent frame in each paper in bold)
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‘national power, pride and interests’ frame (F5) reaches similarly high levels as ‘EU-
wide rules, norms and interests‘ in Libération and, to a lesser extent, in Le Figaro. 
In the Irish dailies as well, the hierarchy of frames is more ambiguous: In the Irish 
Independent, all three frames are almost equally frequent. In the Irish Times, this is 
true for ‘EU-wide rules, norms and interests’ and ‘EU party and policy interests,’ and 
the Irish Examiner even gives most attention to ‘EU party and policy interests’. At 
least as far as German newspapers in comparison to Irish and French media are con-
cerned, there are hence indications for a distinctly national pattern. 
Ideological patterns across borders, on the other hand, can hardly be discerned at 
this level. For example, whereas in the most leftist newspaper in Germany (taz), the 
predominance of the ‘EU-wide rules, norms and interests’ frame is most pronounced, 
the most left-liberal-leaning newspapers in France and Ireland still devote about the 
same level of attention to ‘EU party and policy interests’. 
It should also be reiterated that the comparison of master frames only provides a 
first and broad look at the framing in the three countries. In particular, even if the 
dailies in all countries prominently address ‘EU-wide rules, norms and interests’ and 
this frame certainly represents a common perspective on what is at stake, great dif-
ferences remain possible as to whether the Spitzenkandidaten system or gender, for 
Figure 2: Shares of the master frames in the nine newspapers 










0 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 100 %
F1: EU resilience and unity F2: EU-wide rules, norms, interests F3: Inter-institutional power
F4: EU party and policy interests F5: Nat. power, pride, interests F6: Domestic and inter-state conse.
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example, are placed in the center of the debate. In this light, the next section addres-
ses the three most common master frames overall in more detail, also incorporating 
findings of a more qualitative nature: ‘EU-wide rules, norms and interests’ (F2), ‘EU 
party and policy interests’ (F4) and ‘national power, pride and interests’ (F5). 
(1) Concerning, first, ‘EU-wide rules, norms and interests’ (F2), a marked segmenta-
tion of the debate indeed becomes visible once one dives deeper into the analysis. 
Starting again with the frequencies, German newspapers most commonly highlight 
questions of democracy and transparency, with two out of the three newspapers fea-
turing F2.b as the most frequent subframe (see table 4). The nomination is hence 
presented as a question of respecting — or not — the citizens’ will, for example: 
— “Nun spielt das Brüsseler Schmierentheater das Theaterstück Peinliche Demokratie: EU-
Hinterzimmer-Mafia-Politbüro als oberster Souverän” (taz, 07/06, ‘Top of the flops?’). 
On a more thorough reading, it can be noticed that such discussions of democracy 
and transparency are commonly tied to the Spitzenkandidaten system. Both are then 
presented as being naturally linked, as in the phrase “die demokratische Errungen-
schaft des Spitzenkandidaten-Prinzips” (SZ, 06/22, ‘Weber wankt’). Yet the German 
media’s focus on democracy is also discernible where a link is explicitly denied: 



















system as such 7 % 12 % 11 % 7 % 5 % 10 % 7 % — 5 %
F2.b Democracy 
and transparency
15 % 9 % 15 % 5 % 2 % 5 % — — 5 %
F2.c Balance and 
diversity
2 % 3 % 7 % 6 % 8 % 4 % 11 % 6 % 8 %
F2.d Cand. qualif. 
and standing
13 % 12 % 12 % 10 % 19 % 9 % 7 % 3 % 10 %
F2.e Other EU-
wide interests
3 % 3 % 4 % 1 % 2 % 3 % 1 % 3 % 2 %
Table 4: Shares of F2 subframes in the media coverage 
source: own table; data from Annex II (rounded values; 
most frequent subframe in each newspaper in bold)
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— “Diese Diskussion geht ziemlich durcheinander. Die Spitzenkandidaten waren kein Instru-
ment der Demokratisierung der Europäschen Union […]” (Die Welt, 07/06, ‘Überzogene Er-
wartung an die EU, das übernationale Gute zu verkörpern’). 
Moreover, the importance attributed to democracy and transparency in German me-
dia is also apparent in the headlines — arguably the most prominent section of an 
article. For example, Die Welt published articles entitled ‘Keine Hinterzimmer 
mehr’ (06/26), ‘Söder: Triumph des Hinterzimmers’ (07/02) and the two-piece edito-
rial ‘Verrät die EU durch den Brüsseler Deal ihre demokratischen Werte?’ (07/04). 
In France, on the other hand, questions of democracy and transparency are rarely 
addressed, as indicated by the low frequencies in all three French newspapers. Inte-
restingly, the Spitzenkandidaten system does feature in reporting. However, in Fran-
ce, Spitzenkandidaten and democracy do not tend to be natural companions. Rather, 
when the lead candidate principle is addressed, the focus lies on Emmanuel Macron’s 
opposition to the current system, for example: 
— “Le président français est en effet totalement opposé au système des « Spitzenkandidaten » 
qui consiste à nommer automatiquement à la présidence de l'exécutif européen la tête de la 
liste arrivée en tête aux élections européennes” (Libération, 06/19, ‘Présidence de la Com-
mission : qui sera l'euro élu ?’). 
Even more strikingly, in Ireland, two out of the three newspapers do not feature any 
passage coded with the democracy and transparency frame (F2.b) at all. There, by 
Figure 3: Shares of F2 subframes in the media coverage 
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contrast, priority is given to questions of balance and diversity (F2.c), the subframe 
that appears most regularly in two out of the three Irish papers: 
— “Candidates are needed for the other jobs too, with the package requiring a delicate balance 
of gender, geography and political affiliation” (The Irish Times, 06/22, ‘Leaders holding 
door for UK like some party guest who has overstayed welcome’). 
— “Brussels diplomats said work would focus on compromise candidates and a share-out for-
mula” (Irish Independent, 06/21, ‘Hogan’s EU post on hold until the top roles sorted’). 
On the other hand, in France, news reports tend to focus on candidates’ qualification 
and standing (F.2d), hence closely following the priorities of French President Em-
manuel Macron. This is particularly visible in Le Monde and Le Figaro: 
— “Celui-ci, n'ayant jamais eu de fonctions gouvernementales, il n'aurait pas la « carrure » 
requise” (Le Figaro, 06/20, ‘Entre Paris et Berlin, la bataille des postes clés’). 
— “Elles ont toutes deux une longue expérience des affaires publiques, européennes et interna-
tionales […]” (Le Monde, 07/04, ‘Europe : Un quatuor paritaire et d’expérience’). 
Arguably, ‘candidate qualification and standing’ (F2.d) is also prominent in reports in 
Germany. Hence, not each of the divisions is entirely clear-cut (in this respect, see in 
particular the SZ in table 4). Nevertheless, it remains that the German newspapers 
tend to stand out in terms of the attention given to democracy and transparency, 
whereas other subframes are emphasized more strongly in Ireland and France. 
Divisions or similarities based on papers’ ideological orientation, on the other hand, 
are far less pronounced: One could notably try to argue that dailies at both ends of 
the ideological spectrum focus more on democracy and transparency than those lo-
cated towards the center; this is at least visible in Germany and France. Yet even for 
papers on the left and right, the frequency levels in France and Ireland remain below 
even the lowest level observed in Germany (SZ). Similarly, as concerns F2.a, F2.c and 
F2.d, hardly any pattern in terms of ideology can be identified at all (see table 4). 
Furthermore, the national divisions with respect to democracy and transparency are 
also mirrored in the case of a master frame that may, to some, appear related: the 
distribution of power between the European institutions, including the competences 
of the European Parliament (F3). Although even in German newspapers, the frame is 
by no means highly prominent, with frequencies ranging from seven to eight per-
cent, the levels in all three German newspapers are still substantially higher than in 
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all French newspapers, where the frame is hardly traceable at all (table 3). The latter 
is equally true for Irish newspapers — with one exception, the Irish Times. 
(2) A second important master frame to consider in detail is the ‘EU party and policy 
interests’ frame (F4). As shortly mentioned, one difference between the news reports 
in Germany, France and Ireland is that this frame tends to be on a similar footing to 
the ‘EU-wide rules, norms and interests’ frame (F2) in France and Ireland, whereas 
the same cannot be said for reporting in Germany. 
If one considers the frequencies of F4 in isolation, however, without drawing compa-
risons to F2, national differences do not appear very clear cut: Generally, the frame 
tends to feature somewhat more frequently in reports in France and Ireland, but at 
least Die Welt and Süddeutsche Zeitung reach similar levels as newspapers abroad. 
Even if one opens the box, the observation of broad similarities remains intact. In 
seven out of nine newspapers, the predominant subframe is ‘conflicting party inte-
rests’ (F4.a), while the ‘EU policy and reform’ subframe (F4.b) is attributed a secon-
dary role (see full table in Annex II). The common focus across borders hence lies on 
which party grouping has the power and gets to install his or her candidate, rather 
than on which specific policy agenda will shape the future of the EU. In French 
newspapers, this prioritization is particularly visible, as illustrated in: 
Figure 4: Shares of frames F4 and F5 in the media coverage 








































F5: National power, pride and interests
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— “C’était sans compter avec la rébellion au sein du Parti populaire européen (PPE), la famille 
conservatrice. […] La présidence du Commission est entre les mains de la droite depuis 
quinze ans” (Le Monde, 07/02, ‘A Bruxelles, des nominations au forceps’). 
In the Irish press, on the other hand, there is also a marked framing in terms of ‘EU 
policy and reform’ (F4.b). F4.b is even more frequent than F4.a in one of the Irish 
newspapers, the Irish Independent. Going into the details, this can be attributed, to 
some extent, to a preoccupation with Brexit. In all Irish newspapers, Brexit can be 
identified as an issue that is singled out in the coverage of the nomination process, 
reflecting the particular situation of Ireland in the Brexit dispute: 
— “We can hope her appointment means no change on Brexit” (Irish Independent, 07/03, ‘This 
share-out - especially Ms Lagarde's appointment - looks like Irish good news’). 
— “However, there is no reason to fear that any potential candidate for any of the positions 
would diverge from the strong EU consensus on Brexit” (The Irish Times, 06/20, ‘EU can't 
afford 'jobs for boys' carve-up of posts’). 
— “There is continued speculation as to who will be chosen by member state leaders as the 
new head of the commission, especially with Brexit still firmly on the agenda” (Irish Exami-
ner, 06/27, ‘Varadkar 'flattered' to be linked to top EU role’). 
In France and Germany, Brexit is rarely ever addressed. Rather, the newspapers in 
these countries tend to suggest that policy and policy stances, in general, matter in 
the nomination process, or they discuss different issues in the same breath: 
— “Auch in umwelt- und gesellschaftspolitischen Fragen ist sie vielen zu liberal. Und unter 
Linken gilt die Dänin als zu wirtschaftsfreundlich” (SZ, 06/17, ‘Die traut sich was’). 
— “Hier matin, il affirmait : […] « Nous voulons une personnalité qui mette au centre la crois-
sance, les citoyens, les personnes » (Le Figaro, 07/03, ‘Quand l'Italie menaçait de voter avec 
les pays de l'Est contre l'axe Paris-Berlin’). 
Without doubt, there a hence certain national specificities in terms of F4. Yet, first, 
particularly in comparison to ‘EU-wide rules, norms and interests’ (F2), these diffe-
rences overall seem subtle, and, second, there are also hints at some differences ba-
sed on ideology (e.g., the highest shares of F4 are observed for two centrist/moderate 
newspapers; see Annex II), somewhat counterbalancing the national divisions. 
(3) As for the ‘national pride, power and interests’ frame (F5), the fault lines reappear 
with full force. Only considering the frequency of the master frame, there is a clear 
difference between reporting in German dailies, on the one hand, and the coverage 
in France and Ireland, on the other hand: Although national power and interests are 
Tracing Europeanization in the Mass-Mediated Debate on 2019 EU Leadership Selection !37
also sometimes discussed in Germany, every single French and Irish newspaper di-
rects substantially more attention to such questions. Once again, ideological diffe-
rences do not measure up to the differences between countries: Note, for example, 
that the three newspapers where this frame is most frequent are centrist (Irish Ex-
aminer), conservative (Le Figaro) and left-liberal-leaning (Libération). 
Taking a closer look, further national peculiarities appear. First, while the newspa-
pers in Germany and Ireland tend to focus most on the power and interests of their 
respective country of publication, French newspapers do not focus on France. Ins-
tead, by far the greatest attention is placed on Germany and the role of Angela Mer-
kel — and, remarkably, even more so than in German newspapers, for example:  
— “Si la présidence de la Commission risque encore de lui échapper, l'Allemagne peut toujours 
s'appuyer sur ses représentants, qu'elle a placés dans la machine européenne” (Libération, 
06/19, ‘Au sein de l'Union européenne, l'appétit sans fin de Berlin‘). 
— “Pour Angela Merkel qui joue, au-delà de l'influence de l'Allemagne, son propre héritage 
politique, la partie sera serrée” (Le Figaro, 06/20, ‘Merkel gênée à Bruxelles par la fragilité 
de la GroKo’). 
Furthermore, in France, even slightly more than the power and interests of France 
alone, the Franco-German duo is brought up — a focus that is much less prevalent in 
news reports in Germany and Ireland (see full table in Annex II): 
— “Il montre aussi un rééquilibrage en faveur des grands pays, surtout du couple franco-alle-
mand, et confirme que l'Europe reste encore une affaire carolingienne” (Libération, 07/02, 
‘Union européenne: l'heure des femmes’). 
In the Irish press, the picture is different. While there too, German interests and 
power represents a prominent subframe in two of the three newspapers (Irish Ex-
aminer, The Irish Times), Irish newspapers are mostly marked by a common focus on 
Ireland (F5.c). This is the most frequent subframe in two newspapers and comes in 
second in the Irish Examiner. The national focus of the coverage also tends to be sta-
ted more openly than in the news reports in the other countries: 
— “With important high-level European Union appointments due to be discussed again at the 
EU summit starting today, it is important to consider where Ireland's interests lie” (The 
Irish Times, 06/20, ‘EU can't afford 'jobs for boys' carve-up of posts’). 
— “That would be good news for Ireland, but his problem is that he is also linked to the EPP 
group (Irish Independent, 06/21, ‘Hogan’s EU post on hold until the top roles sorted). 
Tracing Europeanization in the Mass-Mediated Debate on 2019 EU Leadership Selection !38
Furthermore, even where the focus lies on EU politics and policy, issues tend to be 
linked back to the national interest: 
— “The Bavarian leader of EPP in parliament, he is affable and said to be a friend to Ireland 
in engagement over Brexit” (The Irish Times, 06/25, ‘EU’s top jobs: How the main conten-
ders tick the boxes’). 
With respect to Europeanization, however, the most important finding arguably re-
mains that the focus on ‘national pride, power and interests’ (F5), in general, is far 
more prevalent in Ireland and France than in Germany. 
Due to space limitations, it is not possible to go into details as far as the other, over-
all less frequent master frames (F1, F3, F6) are concerned. To at least mention some 
key takeaways, ideological divisions are again less pronounced than national diffe-
rences. Notably, questions of ‘EU resilience and unity’ (F1) are addressed slightly 
more often in the French and Irish press, with the exception of the Irish Examiner. 
The pattern is reversed for the ‘inter-institutional power’ frame (F3), as stated above. 
Finally, there is no clear pattern for ‘domestic and inter-state consequences’ (F6). 
The frame appears most frequently in two Irish newspapers. At the same time, it is 
striking that consequences for German politics and, more specifically, for the Ger-
man governing coalition are addressed cross-nationally, in eight out of the nine 
newspapers, pointing towards shared points of reference. 
Chapter 5.5 will provide a more detailed interpretation of these results. Beforehand, 
however, the key findings related to the discourse participants are presented.  
5.4    Europeanization in terms of discourse participants 
Discourse participants represent the second dimension of Europeanization addres-
sed in the present study. As explained, the main quantitative indicator in this respect 
is the “ratio of national and European discourse participants” (Kaiser & Kleinen-von 
Königslöw, 2017, p. 809), taking into account extended direct and indirect quotations. 
In a first step, one may consider the ratio for all of the newspaper articles published 
in Germany, France and Ireland combined. Adopting such a broad perspective, na-
tional speakers (S1) account for 42 percent of the quotations, EU-level speakers (S2) 
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account for 31 percent, and quotations of speakers from other EU countries (S3) re-
present 24 percent of the statements. In total, European speakers therefore account 
for around 55 percent of all quotations and, hence, for a larger share than national 
speakers. Based on the benchmark set out earlier, this points to high Europeanizati-
on. The remaining three percent of quotations fall into the ‘other/undefined’ catego-
ry (S4); whether they are included or not, the general finding remains the same. 
Clearly, these percentages should not be taken at face value, though. First, given the 
greater number of articles published in German newspapers, the values may be far 
more representative of the coverage in Germany than of reporting in Irish or French 
dailies. Second, a more detailed analysis is necessary to take into account the limits 
set to the coding of speakers, notably the rule that published interviews and guest 
articles are coded only once. In a second step, it is therefore sensible to take a closer 
look at the discourse participants in German, French and Irish media individually. 
(1) To begin with Germany, the picture is somewhat more ambiguous than could 
have been assumed based on the above. Only in Die Welt, European speakers (63 
percent) clearly outnumber national speakers (37 percent). In SZ and taz, by con-
trast, the percentages are very close and even slightly lean towards national spea-
kers. Still, given that quotations of European speakers appear almost as frequently, 
the level of Europeanization can be considered high in all three German newspapers. 
This can be ascribed to different factors: In Die Welt and taz, the share of European 
speakers can be attributed almost entirely to EU-level speakers and, more specifical-
ly, to members of the European Parliament like Jens Geier (S&D), Reinhard Bütikofer 





Figure 5: Discourse participants in the media coverage overall 
source: own illustration; data from Annex II (rounded values, 
calculation based on all extended quotations in all newspapers)
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(Greens/EFA) and Sven Giegold (Greens/EFA), all of whom were highly critical of the 
nomination process and outcome: 
— “Seine Gruppe werde der Ernennung ‘auf keinen Fall’ zustimmen. ‘Sie ist keine Spitzenkan-
didatin und steht in keinem Verhältnis zum Europäischen Parlament […]’” (Die Welt, 07/04, 
‘Die Sensationskandidatin’). 
In taz, Bütikofer even features in a lengthy interview (07/06, ‘Ich bin Nein-Sager’), 
and in Die Welt, Manfred Weber, MEP and candidate for the Commission presidency, 
gets the opportunity to present his ideas in a guest article (06/26, ‘Keine Hinterzim-
mer mehr’). In a way, the EU level is hence even more visible in the reporting of Die 
Welt and taz than indicated by the frequency table. On the other hand, however, one 
is quick to observe that all of these politicians are German in nationality. Given their 
professional functions and following prior literature, they are nonetheless conside-
red, first and foremost, EU-level speakers (see Jentges, Trenz & Vetters, 2007, p. 715).  
As for the Süddeutsche Zeitung, on the other hand, European speakers are split quite 
evenly between the EU level and other member states. In contrast to taz and Die 
Welt, heads of state and government of other member states are substantially more 
prominent in the coverage, in particular French President Emmanuel Macron. In ad-
dition, news reports of foreign journalists are discussed in SZ’s own coverage (07/06, 
‘Neugier auf die Kandidatin’). Members of the EP appear less frequently. 
(2) In French news coverage, at first glance, the highest levels of Europeanization 
can be observed. In both Le Figaro and Libération, European speakers account for 
Figure 6: Discourse participants in German newspapers 
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more than 70 percent of extended quotations. National speakers constitute less than 
20 percent, and the remaining quotations fall into the ‘undefined/other’ category. 
The high percentage in Libération needs to be considered with some care, though: It 
is largely due to a single extended press review (07/02, ‘UE: la stratégie Merkel criti-
quée... mais gagnante’). Also, EU-level speakers are hardly represented in the cover-
age of Libération at all, and the one guest article published by the newspaper was 
written by a member of the French national government, namely, Amélie de Mont-
chalin, secretary of state for European affairs (06/19, ‘On ne va pas nommer le candi-
dat du PPE à la tête de la Commission comme s'il ne s'était rien passé’). 
In Le Figaro, the ratio between speakers from the EU level and other member states 
is more balanced. Compared to news reporting in Germany, it is particularly notice-
able that no priority is given to MEPs of French nationality; instead, German MEPs, 
such as Daniel Caspary (EPP), also feature in the articles, with the latter likely linked 
to the fact that Caspary strongly criticized French President Macron in the process: 
— “« Il n'y a plus d'axe franco-allemand », a déploré lundi Daniel Caspary, le chef des députés 
CDU/CSU au Parlement européen, en accusant le chef de l'État de vouloir « tout faire pour 
détruire la démocratie européenne »” (Le Figaro, 06/26, ‘Bruxelles : la CDU/CSU hausse le 
ton contre Macron’). 
As far as speakers from other member states (S3) are concerned, German nationals 
are again prominent in the news coverage. Particular attention is given to state-
ments of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Yet also Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, 
Figure 7: Discourse participants in French newspapers 
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Martin Schulz and Markus Söder are quoted (see, e.g., Le Figaro, 07/03, ‘Ursula von 
der Leyen, une francophile au profil atypique’). 
Surprisingly, the picture is a very different one for Le Monde. Here, quotations of na-
tional speakers by far outnumber European speakers (68 percent to 32 percent). In 
particular, French President Macron is quoted extensively. Quotations of Amélie de 
Montchalin as well as soundbites attributed to “l’Elysée” or “la délégation française” 
contribute to the high share of national speakers (see, e.g., Le Monde, 07/02, ‘A Bru-
xelles, des nominations au forceps’; 07/04, ‘Le duo Paris-Berlin à la manœuvre mal-
gré tout‘). Comparably little attention is given to the EU level or other EU countries. 
(3) In the Irish press, finally, Europeanization in terms of discourse participants is 
overall lowest: In two out of the three newspapers, national speakers account for a 
clear majority of quotations, that is, 60 percent (Irish Independent) and 75 percent 
(Irish Examiner) respectively. These shares can be attributed almost entirely to quo-
tations of Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar, indicating a clear focus on the national 
executive. More generally, it should be noted that in both newspapers, few extended 
quotations were included in the media coverage at all (10 and 12). 
The Irish Times represents an interesting exception. Here, national speakers account 
for only 41 percent of all extended quotations, whereas European speakers account 
for a majority of 56 percent of quotations. Based on the benchmark set out earlier, 
the debate is hence clearly Europeanized and even more so than in SZ and taz. This 
Figure 8: Discourse participants in Irish newspapers 
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conclusion may be upheld even though the one guest article included was written by 
a national speaker, namely by Bobby McDonagh, former Irish ambassador to the EU 
and the UK (06/20, ‘EU can't afford 'jobs for boys' carve-up of posts’). 
As far as the ratio between speakers from the EU level and other member states is 
concerned, however, the Irish Times is again very much in line with the other two 
Irish newspapers. Soundbites not attributed to EU-level actors clearly dominate in 
each of the Irish dailies. One observation appears particularly pertinent: No member 
of the European Parliament at all appears with an extended quotation in any of the 
Irish papers, whereas the same cannot be said for any newspaper outside of Ireland. 
Concerning the speakers from other member states (S3), the focus is most frequently 
on foreign heads of state and government, at least as far as Irish Examiner and the 
Irish Times are concerned. Similarly to Le Figaro and Le Monde, quotations of Ger-
man Chancellor Merkel, in particular, are included. 
To summarize, the level of Europeanization in terms of speakers overall appears hig-
hest in Germany and France. In Ireland, on the other hand, only one newspaper fea-
tured a substantial amount of “European” quotations. Yet given that in each country, 
there is also one paper that does not correspond to the broader trend, some caution 
in drawing such general conclusions remains warranted. 
5.5    Interpretation of the results 
The interpretation of the present paper’s findings is not straightforward. On the one 
hand, one may argue that the results indeed point towards a Europeanized debate: 
The master frames are broadly shared by the newspapers in the different countries, 
and there are even similarities in prioritizing ‘EU-wide rules, norms and 
interests’ (F2) and ‘EU party and policy interests’ (F4). Furthermore, European spea-
kers are clearly visible in the media coverage, and if one considers all of the articles 
combined, European speakers account for a majority of extended quotations. 
In the author’s view, however, such a condensation of the findings is too rough, es-
pecially as far as the frames are concerned: Without doubt, there are broad similari-
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ties. Nonetheless, divisions appear already at a relatively general level, and, import-
antly, most of these divisions indeed follow “distinctly national patterns” (Van de 
Steeg, 2006, p. 612), which precisely should not be the case in a Europeanized debate. 
For example, when German newspapers from left to right are marked by frames rela-
ted to democratic values, whereas French and Irish newspapers rarely address such 
questions, all the while giving much more attention than German newspapers to 
questions of national power and interests, a very different image of the nomination 
and the EU is presented. Given such different frames of reference, conversations 
across borders can then be expected to be hampered. 
Certainly, additional research is needed in this regard, among others to test whether 
Germany constitutes an isolated case. Indeed, the French and Irish press tend to 
have more in common even though, at a more detailed level, national peculiarities 
can also be identified. At least as far Germany is concerned, however, one can clearly 
trace a nationally specific debate in terms of frames — and remarkably, the segmen-
tation broadly follows a pattern already identified in the study of Trenz (2000): 
In his analysis of the corruption scandal in the Santer Commission, he similarly 
found that German newspapers highlighted universal principles, like democracy, 
whereas the Spanish media focused on traditional conflicts between countries 
(Trenz, 2000, p. 353). Trenz concludes that, even where EU-wide norms were addres-
sed, these only reached a national, German audience (ibid.). Albeit in a much atte-
nuated manner, the findings of the present paper point in a similar direction. 
The reasons underlying the divisions can of course not be stated with certainty. At 
any rate, as far as this study is concerned, the differences between the countries in 
terms of frames cannot be attributed to an exclusion of European speakers: 
Both French and German newspapers, with the exception of Le Monde, are marked 
by a high share of European speakers; still, the described differences in the framing 
are observed. This substantiates previous findings that both dimensions of Europea-
nization do not necessarily coincide (Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2017, p. 811): 
The quoting of European speakers alone does not automatically imply an EU-wide 
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debate in terms of frames.  Instead, particular national circumstances appear to re13 -
main of key importance even when EU-wide speakers are included and a supposedly 
“European” issue or event is discussed. Both issue-specific and broader cultural or 
historical particularities may have impeded a more Europeanized debate:  
Among others, the political elite in Germany arguably placed more emphasis on the 
democratic value of the Spitzenkandidaten principle during the nomination process 
than politicians in France or Ireland. For the CSU, “democracy” came as a useful ar-
gument to justify why Manfred Weber should be nominated, and the SPD eventually 
presented the “disregard for EU democracy” as a reason to call for the end of the co-
alition (Bubrowski & Lohse, 2019). The frame was hence salient in the domestic poli-
tical arena, so the national media may have given it more attention as well.  
Second, given the different political systems, linking the head of the executive to the 
outcome of elections may quite naturally be of a different importance for democracy 
from a “French” perspective — even if this does not quite explain a similar rarity of 
the frame in Ireland. Third, for cultural and historical reasons, it may be more com-
mon for journalists in France and Ireland to openly discuss national power and na-
tional interests than in Germany, as suggested by direct phrases like: “That would be 
good news for Ireland” (Irish Independent, 06/21, ‘Hogan’s EU post […]’). 
Such considerations, combined with the intergovernmental nature of the nominati-
on process (see ch. 3.2), could explain some of the differences in framing. Obviously, 
however, they can only remain speculations at this point and require further rese-
arch. The final chapter now turns to a summary of the paper’s main findings. 
6    Conclusion 
This thesis addressed the following research question: “To what extent was the me-
dia coverage of the 2019 Commission president nomination Europeanized in terms 
 Indeed, journalists may still make different choices as to who specifically to quote, which soundbites 13
to include and how many quotations to incorporate at all. In the case at hand, for example, the fact 
that Die Welt and taz more often than others quoted MEPs criticizing the undemocratic nature of the 
nomination can partly account for the particular prominence of the democracy frame in these papers.
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of framing and discourse participants in German, French and Irish quality newspa-
pers? And what does this imply for the emergence of a European Public Sphere?” 
The analysis yielded results that need to be condensed with care. 
On a general level, it was possible to identify both shared frames and a substantial 
proportion of European speakers in the media coverage. Taking a closer look, howe-
ver, marked national differences were found in the use of frames, setting in particu-
lar German newspapers apart from news reporting in France and Ireland. Remarkab-
ly, it was not least those points of reference which may have been expected to lead to 
similarities in reporting, such as concern for the democratic quality of the process, 
that marked national divisions. As far as speakers are concerned, furthermore, the 
coverage in the Irish press was found to be, in fact, largely nationally confined. 
In all, it therefore appears most appropriate to note a moderate level of Europea-
nization. A truly shared debate could not be observed even though the nomination of 
the Commission president concerned the EU as a whole and required a collective de-
cision. Considering, in addition, that quality newspapers are most likely candidates 
for Europeanization, the findings then suggest remaining wary of claims that a 
common European Public Sphere has already emerged in EU-Europe. 
Clearly, the limitations of the thesis need to be taken into account. The study analy-
zed only a single case and was limited to three countries and a small selection of 
newspapers. Although these decisions were justified on theoretical grounds, they 
nonetheless reduce the generalizability of the results. In addition, the qualitative 
and partly inductive nature of the analysis undeniably leaves room for subjectivity 
even though attempts were made to at least attenuate such concerns. 
Acknowledging these limitations, the study will hopefully still prove useful for rese-
arch: The analysis of the coverage of the nomination process allowed presenting fin-
dings in a recent and novel case that, to some degree, represented a test case for Eu-
ropeanization. Beyond that, the study identified and described a new set of EU-spe-
cific frames that could be examined in further cases. Indeed, the master frames are 
not necessarily limited to the news coverage of the 2019 nomination process or 
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other personnel decisions in the EU. The comprehensive codebook with precise co-
ding rules and anchor examples could therefore come in handy in the future. 
To carry the present study forward, it would be interesting, on the one hand, to con-
duct a comparison over time. Notably, it appears valuable to analyze whether, at the 
moment of Ursula von der Leyen’s election in the European Parliament, the debate 
was more similar in the countries of the EU, suggesting a convergence over time. Si-
milarly, one could trace the levels of Europeanized reporting during the nomination 
of Jean-Claude Juncker in 2014 and compare them to the present study. This could 
also help to better identify the reasons underlying the national divisions. 
On the other hand, it would be useful to extend the present analysis to a greater set 
of countries and newspapers. Taking note of the groundwork laid by this paper, a 
more quantitative analysis with more sophisticated statistical measures could serve 
to enlarge the thesis’ scope and value in the future. 
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8    Annex 
8.1    Annex I: Coding instructions and detailed coding scheme 
Coding instructions 
• Sample: Newspaper articles are selected based on the keywords and rules listed in chapter 4.1. 
• In each article, only those text passages are coded that are linked to the 2019 nomination of 
the Commission president (incl. less specific references to candidate “selection”/“choice”): 
• Hence, digressions (e.g., into the EU’s economic situation) are not coded if they are not 
explicitly tied back to the candidate selection (general rule: in the same paragraph). 
• Similarly, passages addressing appointments to the other EU posts are not generally 
coded, unless (1) they discuss the  “top job selection” more broadly, also involving the 
post of Commission president (e.g., “The EU jobs package creates a balance in terms of 
gender.”) or (2) they help to clarify the framing of an immediately preceding or subse-
quent passage related to the Commission president (e.g., “The Social Democrat Tim-
mermans would be nominated as Commission president […] The Liberals would get the 
post of Council president […] The Conservatives […]”) 
• Coding of frames 
• Coding categories for frames are attributed, at a minimum, to one sentence (ending 
with a period, a question mark or an exclamation mark) and, at a maximum, to one pa-
ragraph. Following this rule, if the same frame (category) applies to two consecutive 
paragraphs, it is coded twice. 
• No single sentence should be coded with more than one category. In difficult cases, 
particular attention should be payed to the context in order to determine the predo-
minant frame. Cases that remain ambiguous are left uncoded and flagged in order to 
be able to consider them more closely in a qualitative examination. 
• In general, the context of sentences should always be taken into account in deciding on 
the attribution of a coding category. It is always preferable to code multiple sentences 
as a group rather than a single sentence. 
• These rules serve to prevent fragmentation and a neglect of the context of single words and 
phrases which is, however, central to the understanding of frames as broader structures of 
meaning (Elo et al., 2014, p. 5). In addition, they allow for subsequently comparing the fre-
quency or “weight” of each frame in the newspapers. 
• Coding of discourse participants 
• All indirectly or directly quoted statements are coded that are at least two sentences 
long (Wessler et al., 2008, p. 47; the end of a sentence is indicated by a period, a questi-
on mark or an exclamation mark). 
• The expectation underlying this formal criterion is that such extended statements offer 
“speakers the chance to express their opinions and to give at least some kind of basic justifi-
cation for them” (ibid.); the speaker thus takes an active and visible part in the debate. 
• The “‘two-sentences’ criteria [is] employed generously, that is if in one article a state-
ment by somebody [is] quoted several times, but each time only in one sentence, then 
this was still coded” (Wessler, 2008, p. 217). 
• In contrast to Wessler (2008), in order to be able to compare the frequency of specific 
speakers in the material, each speaker is not only coded once per article. Instead, each 
new set of two sentences is coded. Exception: Guest articles, interviews or letters to the 
editor are coded only once but flagged for a qualitative assessment. 
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Detailed coding scheme (I): Frames  
Category Description Examples Coding rules
F1: EU resilience 
and unity
• nomination*1 is linked 
to broader questions of 
the EU’s viability/exis-
tence and unity 
• e.g., crisis in/of the EU, 
general capacity to find 
solutions and reach 
agreements, questions 
of the EU’s existence, 
exacerbated divisions in 
the EU, potential disin-
tegration of the Union
• “Gelingt das nicht, 
steht der EU ein langer 
[…] Kampf um Spit-
zenjobs bevor, der die 
Gemeinschaft zu spal-
ten droht.” 
• “Die EU steht deswe-
gen neben dem Brexit 
vor einer zweiten 
Krise.” 
• “Au bord de l'abîme, 
l'Europe s'est sauvée.”
• necessary generalization 
beyond the single nomination 
procedure, not just description 
of leaders currently being in a 
deadlock 
• passage is not coded here if a 
potential  “conflict” between EP 
and European Council is ad-
dressed, only if it is made expli-
cit that this conflict may im-
pede the EU’s functioning, e.g., 
referring to a potential “crisis”
F2: EU-wide 
rules, norms and 
interests
• nomination discussed 
in terms of specific EU 
rules, principles, norms
• (see below: F2.a-F2.e) • (see below: F2.a-F2.e)
‣ F2.a: Spitzenkan 
didaten system 
as such
• nomination discussed 
as a matter of respec-
ting, supporting or dis-
missing the lead candi-
date system/principle  
• either the system itself 
is debated or the dis-
cussion of candidates is 
centered on their cha-
racteristic as (not) being 
a Spitzenkandidat 
• “Dahinter steht der 
erbitterte Streit über 
die Frage, ob nur 
Kommissionsprä-
sident werden soll, wer 
als Spitzenkandidat 
[…] angetreten ist.” 
• “The spitzenkandida-
ten system has […] 
collapsed under its 
own lack of logic.”
• an isolated adjectival reference 
along the lines of “Spitzenkan-
didat Weber” is not coded here 
• passage is not coded here if the 
system is discussed but imme-
diately linked to broader norms 
of democracy and transparency 
(code as F2.b) or to the power 
of the EU’s institutions (F3) 
• proposals for a reform of the 




• nomination discussed 
as a broader matter of 
EU democracy, legiti-
macy and transparency 
• e.g., respecting the 
people’s will, making 
decision making in the 
EU comprehensible and 
transparent, increasing 
voter participation
• “‘Emmanuel Macron 
est un révisionniste qui 
fait tout […] pour dé-
truire la démocratie 
européenne’.” 
• “Ska Keller kritisiert, 




• (see coding rules for F2.a: if the 
lead candidate principle is linked 
to broader values of democracy 
or transparency, code here; also 
applies where proposals for re-
forming the system are discussed 
in terms of improving democra-
cy/transparency in the EU)
‣ F2.c: Balance 
and diversity
• nomination discussed 
with a view to balan-
cing different concerns 
and interests and to 
selecting nominees that 
represent the diversity 
of the European Union, 
including in terms of 
gender (selecting a fe-
male candidate)
• “Mr Varadkar also said 
the nominations were 
‘very good gender 
balance’.” 
• "Yesterday, however, 
the exhausted leaders 
agreed a package of 
names that balanced 
party, gender and 
geography.”
• passage coded here if “balance” 
is addressed explicitly or if a 
range of interests/concerns are 
addressed in the same breath 
that had to be reconciled (e.g., 
geography, gender) 
• passage may also relate to the 
“top jobs package” as a whole 
• also code here if (female) gen-
der is highlighted
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‣ F2.d: Candidate 
qualification 
and standing
• nomination discussed 
with a view to candi-
dates’ qualification, 
skills and professional 




sed on prior posts held)
• “Leaders have also 
been inclined to add 
the requirement of 
executive experience.” 
• “Von der Leyen stehe 
dafür, ‘dass Leute, die 
Fehler machen, keine 
Verantwortung tragen 
müssen’.”
• either relevance of experience/
skills/standing in general is ad-
dressed or candidates are eva-
luated based on such criteria 
• evaluations of candidates’ prior 
work life are coded where ge-
neral judgements are implied 
(e.g., “not a good leader”) or 
where linked back to job in EU
‣ F2.e: Other EU-
wide interests
• nomination presented 
in terms of other, alle-
gedly shared EU-wide 
interests  
• e.g. EU’s image, EU’s 
assertiveness in the 
world, innovation
• “Dieses Geschachere 
um Posten schadet 
Europa, sagte er.”
• text passage coded here either 
if a reference to an unspecified 
“EU interest” or to a specific 
common concern (not captured 
by F2.a-e or F1) is made 




• nomination discussed 
in terms of the distribu-
tion of power btw. EU 
institutions
• (see below: F3.a-F3.c) • (see above F2.a: if lead candidate 
system is discussed with broader 
link to power between institu-
tions, code here as F.3a/b/c)
‣ F3.a: Power of 
the EP




• “Das EU-Parlament 
würde […] auf Dauer 
seine eigene Herabstu-
fung mitbeschließen.”
• passage not coded here if the 
EP’s power is discussed in rela-
tion to the quality of democracy 
in the EU (code as F2.b)
‣ F3.b: Power of 
the European 
Council
• ... with a focus on the 
power/prerogatives of 
the European Council 
and heads of state/gov.




• (see category description and 
general rules for F3)
‣ F3.c: General/ 
EP vs. European 
Council
• ... with a joint focus on 
the EP and the Eu-
ropean Council or with 
another focus (≠3.a-b)




• description of an “inter-institu-
tional conflict” is not sufficient; 
necessary struggle for power/
prerogatives/competences
F4: EU party and 
policy interests
• nomination discussed 
as a question of which 
party is in power in the 
EU and of which poli-
cies are pursued
• (see below: F4.a-F4.b) • (see below: F4.a-F4.b)
‣ F4.a: Conflicting 
party interests
• nomination discussed 
in terms of which party, 
political group or broad 
ideology (such as “the 
Conservatives”) prevails 
in the EU and finds itself 
represented in the can-
didate nomination  
• party/ideology division 
presented as the main 
line of conflict in the 
process
• “Mr Varadkar's main 
preoccupation […] 
had been to ensure 
the EPP retained its 
control of the top 
commission job.” 
• “Elle appartient à la 
famille libérale-cen-
triste, ce qui permet de 
rompre avec le duo-
pole conservateurs-
socialistes.”
• either the issue of particular 
parties’ power/representation in 
the EU is addressed directly or 
the discussion of candidates is 
centered on party affiliation 
• an isolated adjectival reference, 
such as “EPP candidate Weber,” 
is not coded; instead, a pattern 
or juxtaposition centered on 
party affiliation (e.g., “EPP lea-
ders oppose the S&D candi-
date”) must be identifiable
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ries*2 for a more 
detailed analy-
sis, e.g., Brexit, 
Economy)
• nomination discussed 
as a question of which 
political agenda is pur-
sued in the EU, i.e. of 
which policies or re-
forms the candidates 
and other leaders in the 
EU advocate 
• suggests that the no-
mination matters for 
policies/reforms in the 
future
• “Ms von der Leyen has 
previously been sup-
portive of greater de-
fence co-operation in 
the EU.” 
• “Auch in umwelt- und 
gesellschaftspoliti-
schen Fragen ist sie 
vielen zu liberal.” 
• “Der Kommissionschef 
ist allein verantwort-
lich für alle neuen Ge-
setzesvorlagen.”
• passage coded both if the rele-
vance of policy in choosing a 
candidate, in general, is addres-
sed (see third example) or if the 
candidates/the process are dis-
cussed with reference to speci-
fic policies or reforms 
• if candidates’ policy positions 
are discussed, they do not have 
to concern EU-specific policies; 
they may also be of a more ge-
neral nature as long as they are 
linked back to the nomination
F5: National 
power, pride and 
interests
• nomination discussed 
as a question of which 
country or national lea-
der (head of state or 
government) is predo-
minant in the EU, of 
which country is repre-
sented in the candidate 
line-up and of which 
country gets to reap 
specific “national bene-
fits” from the nomina-
tion
• (see below: F5.a-F5.f) • passage coded here if power or 
authority of countries/nat. lea-
ders are addressed directly (see 
example F5.e), if the discussion 
of candidates is centered on 
their nationality (see ex. F5.a) or 
if the nomination is brought 
into relation with some alleged 
“national interest” (see ex. F5.c) 
• in order to enhance reliability in 
the coding of F5(a-f), more detai-
led guidelines were formulated   
( ‣ see note *3 below the table)
‣ F5.a Germany/
Merkel
• ... with a focus on Ger-
many or German Chan-
cellor A. Merkel
• “Gewinner und Profi-
teure: Da ist zunächst 
einmal Deutschland.”
• (see category description, general 
coding rules for F5 and note)
‣ F5.b France/
Macron
• ... with a focus on 
France or French Pre-
sident E. Macron
• “Macron had been 
determined that at 
least one job would go 
to France.”
• (see category description, general 
coding rules for F5 and note)
‣ F5.c Ireland/
Varadkar
• ... with a focus on Ire-
land or Irish Prime Mi-
nister L. Varadkar
• “The question also 
arises as to whether 
specific Irish interests 
would be best served.”
• (see category description, general 
coding rules for F5 and note)
‣ F5.d Visegrád/
Eastern Europe
• ... with a focus on Eas-
tern EU countries/the 
“V4” (incl. Hungary) and 
their leaders
• “No politician from the 
east is among the five 
nominees.”
• (see category description, general 
coding rules for F5 and note)
‣ F5.e Franco-
German duo
• ... with a focus on the 
Franco-German duo or 
France and Germany 
jointly
• “The package of top 
jobs […] reinforces the 
Franco-German pre-
eminence […].”
• (see category description, general 
coding rules for F5 and note)
‣ F5.f General/
Other
• ... with a focus on ano-
ther country or a gene-
ral focus on national 
power/pride/interests
• “Les postes de direc-
tion de l'Union sont 
entre les mains des six 
membres fondateurs.”
• (see category description, general 
coding rules for F5 and note)
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_______ 
*1 To be coded with any one of the categories (F1-F6), passages do 
not by all means have to explicitly mention the “nomination” process 
or the “nomination” negotiations. Rather, they may also refer less 
specifically to the “selection” or choice of a Commission president, as 
this selection centrally involves the candidate’s nomination by the 
European Council and as all of the articles examined were published 
during the key phase of the nomination process. 
*2 As far as the analysis of F2.e, F4.b and F6.a-c is concerned, the 
following subcategories were formulated: 
• F2.e: common EU interest, EU image, innovation/change in lea-
dership, strength of EU, general/other (e.g., support, credibility) 
• F4.b: Brexit, climate change, economy/finance, EU functioning 
(polity/political system), federalism, migration policy, rule of law/
values, security/military, general/other 
• F6.a: cabinet posts, coalition CDU-CSU-SPD, Merkel domestic 
standing/power, relationship CSU-Merkel/role CSU, nomination 
of German commissioner*4, general/various 
• F6.b: Macron domestic standing/power 
• F6.c: nomination of Irish commissioner*4, Varadkar domestic 
standing/power, Varadkar quitting as PM, general/various 
*3 The following guidelines were formulated to enhance the reliability 
and transparency in the coding of category F5.a-f: 
• First, corresponding to the coding rules for F4.a, an isolated adjec-
tival reference along the lines of “German candidate Weber” is not 
coded; instead, a pattern or juxtaposition centered on candidates’ 
nationality must be identifiable (e.g., “Die Franzosen dürfen Chris-
tine Lagarde in die europäischen Institutionen schicken, die Deut-
schen von der Leyen.”). 
• Second, text passages that discuss candidates’ stances on EU 
policy are, by default, coded as F4.b (and hence not as F5.a-f). 
This also applies where such policy positions are presented as the 
reason why a national leader (or even “country A”) opposes or 
supports a given candidate. Only where the discussion of policy is 
entirely subsumed under the consideration of some particularistic 
“national interest”, the passage is coded as F5.a-f (e.g., “Macron 
sucht als Präsidenten der EU-Kommission jemanden […], der 
unter dem Deckmantel einer europäischen Agenda französische 
Interessenpolitik betreibt”). More generally, the consideration of a 
nationally defined/delimited interest is also apparent in formula-
tions such as “The appointments were ‘friends of Ireland’” or “La 
France pourra compter sur une alliée à Bruxelles […] Elle connaît 
bien la France”; such passages are equally coded as F5.a-f. 
• Third, where the outcome of the nomination process is described 
in terms of which country or national leader “won” or “lost” (using 
terminology of winning, losing and victory), the passage is also 
coded under F5.a-f. 
*4 Where the Commission president selection is described as having 
consequences/implications for a country's (e.g., Ireland’s) nomi-
nation of its next EU commissioner, the text passage was usually 
coded as F6(a-e). This is motivated on the grounds that the re-
spective passages rarely considered the EU level, instead presen-
ting the appointment of the next commissioner as a question that 
concerns the national government, domestic party politics and 
domestic politicians (e.g., “Mr Varadkar also confirmed the Cabi-
net will decide who to propose as Ireland's own commissioner for 
the new European Commission once the process of appointing a 
president is complete”; “He said he would wait especially for the 
deal on who would replace Commission president Jean-Claude 
Juncker before announcing whether his old party colleague Mr 
Hogan would get the nod for another five years”). In such cases, 
F6.c hence appeared to be a more appropriate category than F5, 
for instance. This applies to both the media coverage in Irish and 
German media. 
F6: Domestic and 
inter-state 
consequences 
• nomination discussed 
as having conse-
quences/implications 
beyond the EU level, 
namely for domestic 
politics or the broader 
relationships between 
European countries
• (see below: F6.a-F6.e) • where consequences for the 
relationship between countries 
are discussed, they should not 
be restricted/linked back to the 
EU, but be more general 
• for a closer analysis, codings are 
further organized into subcate-
gories*2: e.g. German coalition
‣ F6.a German 
politics
• ... with a focus on poli-
tics in Germany
• “Die Nominierung [...] 
hat neuen Krach in der 
Koalition ausgelöst.”
• (see general rules above: F6; also 
see note *4 below the table)
‣ F6.b French 
politics
• ... with a focus on poli-
tics in France
• “Das […] kommt für 
Macron auch innen-
politisch zu einem 
günstigen Zeitpunkt.”
• (see general rules above: F6; also 
see note *4 below the table)
‣ F6.c Irish 
politics
• ... with a focus on poli-
tics in Ireland
• “It clarifies the ‘battle 
lines’ for the next elec-
tion’.”
• (see general rules above: F6; also 




• ... with a focus on the 
relationship btw. Ger-
many and France
• “Il vient compliquer 
une relation franco-
allemande tendue.”
• (see general rules above: F6)
‣ F6.e General/
Other
• ... with another focus • “Orbán ist […] noch 
da. Das kann er da-
heim gut verkaufen.”
• (see general rules above: F6)
Tracing Europeanization in the Mass-Mediated Debate on 2019 EU Leadership Selection !58
Detailed coding scheme (II): Discourse participants  
Category Description Examples Coding rules
S1: National 
speakers
• extended quotation is 
attributed to a national 
speaker, i.e., a person 
linked mainly to the nat. 
level (see details below)*
• (see examples below) • two-sentence criterion applies 
(for all of the categories) 
• for a closer analysis, codings 
are organized into subcatego-
ries for each individ. speaker
‣ S1.a National 
head of state or 
government
• passage quotes the head 
of state or government 
of the country where the 
newspaper is based
• “Merkel sagte: ‘Wenn 
wir wüssten, was sich 
morgen ändern soll, 
[…]’”
• subcategories a.o.: DE A. Mer-
kel, FR E. Macron, IR L. Varadkar
‣ S1.b National 
minister
• passage quotes a minis-
ter of the country where 
the newspaper is based
• “‘L’Allemagne n’a pas 
fait le travail […]’, 
s'étonnait Amélie de 
Montchalin.”
• subcategories a.o.: FR A. de 
Montchalin (EU minister)
‣ S1.c National 
MPs and party 
leaders
• passage quotes a mem-
ber of parliament (incl. 
state parliaments) or a 
party leader in the coun-
try where the newspaper 
is based
• Fianna Fail leader Mi-
chel Martin backed Mr 
Timmermans, saying: "I 
find it extraordinary 
that the Taoiseach is 
putting EPP […]”
• (note: quotations of German 
MP Martin Schulz in German 
media coded here but marked 
with an asterisk b/c he was pre-
viously a well-known MEP)
‣ S1.d Other na-
tional speaker
• passage quotes other 
national speakers; e.g., 
“officials”, retired national 
politicians, readers, aca-
demics or journalists in 
the country where the 
newspaper is based
• “‘Un couple déséquili-
bré […] explique-t-on 
à  l’Élysée […].” 
• "Das Europa der Bürger 
[…], schimpfte etwa 
[…]| der frühere CSU-
Chef Erwin Huber.”
• (note: quotations of Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit in French media 
coded here but marked with an 




• extended quotation is 
attributed to a speaker at 
EU level, i.e. a person 
linked mainly to the EU 
institutions (see detailed 
definitions below)
• (see examples below) • for a closer analysis, codings 
are organized into subcatego-
ries for each individ. speaker 
(nationality and EU party affi-
liation of speakers is noted)
‣ S2.a European 
Commission
• passage quotes a mem-
ber of or candidate for 
the European Commis-
sion (incl. lead candi-
dates, von der Leyen)
• “Weber behauptet 
zwar, dass ihn das Er-
gebnis des EU-Gipfels 
nicht besonders über-
rascht habe.”
• subcategories a.o.: M. Weber 
(DE, EPP), F. Timmermans (NL, 
S&D), J.-C. Juncker (LUX, EPP)
‣ S2.b MEPs and 
party leaders
• passage quotes a mem-
ber of the European Par-
liament or a leader of a 
European party 
• “‘Il n'y a plus d'axe 
franco-allemand', a 
déploré lundi Daniel 
Caspary.”
• subcategories a.o.: DE_EPP D. 
Caspary, IT_S&D D. Sassoli
‣ S2.c President of 
the European 
Council (Tusk)
• passage quotes Donald 
Tusk, president of the 
European Council
• “‘Tusk stellte aber auch 
klar: ‘Erwarten Sie kei-
nen weißen Rauch.”
• no subcategories
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_______ 
* The main basis for this coding scheme is the study of Jentges, Trenz and Vetters (2007, p. 715). Note that there is doubtlessly some degree of 
overlap between the categories. For example, heads of state and government as well national ministers of other member states are considered 
‘other member states’ speakers’ (S3) even though they are also members of EU institutions (i.e., of the Council/European Council). The afore-
mentioned study provided guidance in such regards. Particularly controversial codings (e.g., M. Schulz: German MP/former MEP) are flagged.  
‣ S2.d Other EU-
level speaker
• passage quotes other 
speakers linked to the EU 
level; e.g. “EU diplomats”, 
"EU insiders”
• “‘Timmermans est la 
conséquence […], ré-
agit une source euro-
péenne […].”





• extended quotation is 
attributed to a speaker 
who is linked to another 
EU country (see details in 
subcategories below)
• (see examples below) • for a closer analysis, codings 
are organized into subcatego-
ries for each individ. speaker 
(nationality and EU party affi-
liation of speakers is noted)
‣ S3.a Foreign 
head of state or 
government
• passage quotes the head 
of state or government 
of an EU country other 
than where the newspa-
per is based
• “Macron kontert um-
gehend: ‘Wir brauchen 
das beste Team für 
Europa’.”
• subcategories a.o.: BU_EPP B. 
Borissow, DE_EPP A. Merkel, 
LUX_RE X. Bettel
‣ S3.b Foreign 
minister
• passage quotes a minis-
ter of another EU mem-
ber state than where the 
newspaper is based
• “The new president of 
the Commission will 
have to present plans 
[…] said Dutch deputy 
finance minister.”
• subcategories a.o.: NL Menno 
Snel (Deputy finance minister)
‣ S3.c Foreign 
MPs and party 
leaders
• passage quotes a mem-
ber of parliament (incl. 
state parliaments) or a 
party leader in another 
EU country than where 
the newspaper is based
• “‘’Je ne suis pas en-
thousiasmé par M. 
Macron’, a déclaré le 
président de la CSU 
Markus Söder.”
• (note: quotations of German 
MP Martin Schulz in foreign 
media coded here but marked 
with an asterisk b/c he was pre-
viously a well-known MEP)
‣ S3.d Other fo-
reign speakers
• passage quotes other 
speakers from other 




• “Eine französische 
Journalistin will in der 
Pressekonferenz nach 
dem EU-Gipfel wissen, 
ob die Bundeskanzlerin 
nun ihre Prioritäten 
geändert habe.”
• (note: quotations of Financial 
Times coded here but marked 
with an asterisk b/c it has 
strong global/EU profile) 
• subcategories a.o.: media/aca-
demics (w/ further subcatego-
ries for individual speakers)
S4: Undefined/
Other
• extended quotation is 
attributed to a speaker 
not corresponding to 
any of the categories 
above, e.g., due to the 
vagueness of the des-
cription (“a negotiator”)
• “'Da werden Wüsche 
geäußert’, sagt einer, 
der das Verfahren 
schon ein paarmal 
erlebt hat.”
• for a closer analysis, codings 
are organized into subcatego-
ries for each individ. speaker 
• subcategories a.o.: “a person 
with knowledge”, US D. Trump
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F1: EU resilience 
and unity 3.9 % 4.7 % 2.4 % 5.8 % 5.0 % 5.2 % 8.2 % — 6.2 %
F2: EU-wide rules, 
norms, interests 40.1 % 38.7 % 48.9 % 28.6 % 35.7 % 32.3 % 26.0 % 12.5 % 29.9 %
F2.a Spitzenkandidat. 
system as such 7.0 % 11.5 % 11.2 % 7.0 % 5.0 % 10.4 % 6.8 % — 4.6 %
F2.b Democracy and 
transparency 14.8 % 9.1 % 15.3 % 4.7 % 2.0 % 5.2 % — — 5.2 %
F2.c Balance and di-
versity 2.1 % 3.0 % 6.5 % 5.8 % 7.9 % 4.2 % 11.0 % 6.3 % 8.2 %
F2.d Candidate qualif.  
and standing 13.0 % 11.8 % 12.4 % 9.9 % 18.8 % 9.4 % 6.8 % 3.1 % 9.8 %
F2.e Other EU-wide 
interests 3.2 % 3.3 % 3.5 % 1.2 % 2.0 % 3.1 % 1.4 % 3.1 % 2.1 %
F3: Inter-institu-
tional power 8.1 % 8.3 % 7.1 % 0.6 % 1.0 % 1.0 % 1.4 % — 6.1 %
F3.a Power of the Eu-
ropean Parliament 4.2 % 3.6 % 1.8 % — 1.0 % — 1.4 % — 4.1 %
F3.b Power of the Eu-
ropean Council 1.1 % 1.1 % 1.8 % 0.6 % — 1.0 % — — 1.5 %
F3.c General/EP vs. 
European Council 2.8 % 3.6 % 3.5 % — — — — — 0.5 %
F4: EU party and 
policy interests 26.4 % 26.7 % 21.8 % 30.4 % 32.6 % 31.3 % 26.0 % 37.6 % 30.4 %
F4.a Conflicting party 
interests 16.2 % 16.5 % 11.8 % 18.1 % 25.7 % 21.9 % 6.8 % 18.8 % 16.0 %
F4.b EU Policy and 
reform 10.2 % 10.2 % 10.0 % 12.3 % 6.9 % 9.4 % 19.2 % 18.8 % 14.4 %
F5: Nat. power, 
pride, interests 13.4 % 15.1 % 7.7 % 24.5 % 22.8 % 28.2 % 23.4 % 31.2 % 21.5 %
F5.a Germany/ 
Merkel 4.2 % 7.4 % 4.1 % 11.7 % 7.9 % 16.7 % 1.4 % 15.6 % 4.6 %
F5.b France/ 
Macron 2.8 % 2.5 % — 2.9 % 4.0 % 2.1 % — — 1.5 %
F5.c Ireland/ 
Varadkar — — — — — — 19.2 % 9.4 % 7.7 %
F5.d Visegrád/ 
Eastern Europe 2.5 % 0.5 % 0.6 % 1.8 % 3.0 % 2.1 % 1.4 % 0.0 % 1.5 %
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Percentages may not total 100 due rounding. 
Read: 3.9 percent of all passages coded in Die Welt feature the ‘EU resilience and unity frame’. 
II. Discourse participants 
F5.e Franco- 
German duo 2.5 % 2.2 % 2.4 % 5.8 % 6.9 % 3.1 % — 3.1 % 4.1 %
F5.f General/ 
Other 1.4 % 2.5 % 0.6 % 2.3 % 1.0 % 4.2 % 1.4 % 3.1 % 2.1 %
F6: Domestic and 
inter-state conse. 8.1 % 6.6 % 12.4 % 9.9 % 3.0 % 2.1 % 15.0 % 18.8 % 5.6 %
F6.a German 
politics 7.0 % 4.4 % 11.8 % 7.0 % 3.0 % 2.1 % 2.7 % — 1.0 %
F6.b French 
politics — 0.8 % — 0.6 % — — — — —
F6.c Irish 
politics — — — — — — 12.3 % 18.8 % 4.1 %
F6.d Relationship 
Germany-France 0.7 % 1.4 % 0.6 % 2.3 % — — — — —
F6.e General 








































speakers 37.0 % 48.6 % 53.0 % 14.6 % 68.2 % 17.3 % 60.0 % 75.0 % 41.3 %
S1.a National head of 
state or government 12.3 % 23.6 % 14.7 % 4.9 % 31.8 % — 50.0 % 58.3 % 17.2 %
S1.b National 
minister — — — — 9.1 % 4.3 % — — —
S1.c National MPs 
and party leaders 18.5 % 19.4 % 11.8 % 2.4 % — — 10.0 % — —
S1.d Other 
national speaker 6.2 % 5.6 % 26.5 % 7.3 % 27.3 % 13.0 % — 16.7 % 24.1 %
S2: EU-level 
speakers 53.9 % 22.2 % 38.2 % 41.4 % 22.6 % 8.7 % 10.0 % — 20.6 %
S2.a European 
Commission 7.7 % 8.3 % 2.9 % 14.6 % 4.5 % — 10.0 % — 10.3 %
S2.b MEPs and 
party leaders 43.1 % 6.9 % 29.4 % 17.1 % 13.6 % 8.7 % — — —
S2.c President of Eu- 
ropean Council (Tusk) 3.1 % 5.6 % 5.9 % 2.4 % — — — — 6.9 %
S2.d Other 
EU-level speaker — 1.4 % — 7.3 % 4.5 % — — — 3.4 %
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Percentages may not total 100 due rounding. 
Read: 37.0 percent of all extended quotations in Die Welt are attributed to ‘national speakers’.  
Legend 
• DE: German newspaper, FR: French newspaper, IR: Irish newspaper 
• c: conservative, m: centrist/moderate, l: left-/liberal-leaning 
• Welt (Die Welt), SZ (Süddeutsche Zeitung), taz (taz, die tageszeitung) 
• Figa (Le Figaro), Mon (Le Monde), Libé (Libération) 
• Inde (Irish Independent), Exam (Irish Examiner), Times (The Irish Times) 
S3: Other member 
states' speakers 9.2 % 25.0 % 8.8 % 36.7 % 9.1 % 65.2 % 30.0 % 25.0 % 34.4 %
S3.a Foreign head of 
state or government 6.2 % 12.5 % 5.9 % 17.1 % — 8.7 % — 25.0 % 31.0 %
S3.b Foreign 
minister 1.5 % — — — — — 10.0 % — —
S3.c Foreign MPs and 
party leaders — — — 9.8 % 9.1 % 4.3 % — — 3.4 %
S3.d Other foreign 
speakers 1.5 % 12.5 % 2.9 % 9.8 % — 52.2 % 20.0 % — —
S4: Undefined/
Other — 4.2 % — 7.3 % — 8.7 % — — 3.4 %
Speakers
DE_c
Welt
DE_m
SZ
DE_l 
taz
FR_c 
Figa
FR_m 
Mon
FR_l 
Libé
IR_c 
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IR_m 
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